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Mortgages have been used from time immemorial to facilitate the 
borrowing of money by landowners. In brief, a mortgage creates a lien 
upon the property through the voluntary act of the borrower to secure the 
payment of the debt. In the early days the mortgage was a nmort gage” 
or dead pledge.^ The borrower conveyed title to and surrendered possession 
of his property to the lender and was given an agreement to the effect that 
if the debt was paid as contracted the conveyance became void. If, on the 
other hand, the debt was not paid by the due date, the pledge became dead 
and the lender kept the property regardless of its value in relationship 
to the debt. 
The mortgage is the oldest form of debt instrument still in wide 
use and, hence, among the oldest forms of investment available to finan¬ 
cial institutions. While already well developed in the Roman era, with 
the rights of borrower and lender clearly defined, it evolved through 
English common law and German courts into the mortgage instrument of to¬ 
day. The Roman hypotheca is considered to be the direct forebearer of 
the modern mortgage in which the borrower retains title, possession, and 
use of his land and property contingent upon fulfillment of his mortgage 
obligation. This is not to suggest that the modern mortgage is a uniform, 
simple document. Quite the contrary. Differences in mortgage laws and 
^Henry E. Hoagland, Real Estate Principles (New York: McGraw Hill 
Book Company, 19i>5)j P« 139. 
1 
2 
practices persist throughout the United States. Mortgage instruments 
continue to be as cumbersome and costly, and foreclosure proceeding as 
lengthy as ever before. Indeed the wide diversity of practice among 
states, regarding important variations in borrowers* rights of redemption, 
deficiency, judgments, foreclosure costs and procedures, and lenders' 
rights in event of default is extremely confusing. The several attempts 
that have been made over the years, since the early part of the twentieth 
century, to unify and simplify the variety of state mortgage laws and 
procedures have all met with failure.^ The free flow of mortgage funds 
across state lines is, therefore, still impeded by the complexities and 
2 
variations of state mortgage laws. 
In the earliest days of American real estate finance, individuals 
were the main source of mortgage funds, joined somewhat later by private 
banking houses and specialized private land banks. Despite the early and 
widespread failures of land banks, similar institutions were organized in 
the early nineteenth century to lend on farm mortgages. These also were 
generally unsuccessful, and throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries individual lenders remained the principal source of credit. 
Further, in spite of Hamilton's admonitions on the incompatibility of 
mortgage paper with the requirements of commercial banking, state-charted 
commercial banks, from the beginning of the Republic, were heavily in- 
3 
volved in loans on both farm and town property. 
^Saul B. Klaman, The Postwar Residential Mortgage Market (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 135. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., p. 136. 
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Beginning in the early part of the nineteenth century, other types 
of financial intermediaries—mutual savings banks, life insurance com¬ 
panies, savings and loan associations (then called building societies)— 
have entered the field to broaden the sources of funds available for mort¬ 
gage financing. An additional source was provided after 1863 by the for¬ 
mation of national banks, though they were limited in that function by 
severe legal restrictions. "Participation by these diverse types of finan¬ 
cial institutions, mortgage financing and markets expanded over the de¬ 
cades, have assumed an increasingly dominate role as suppliers of mortgage 
1 
funds, and their operations have varied in the process." 
Mature and scope of the study.—This is a case study of two small 
and young mortgage finance companies engaged in two distinct areas of mort¬ 
gage financing. Atlanta Mortgage Brokerage, a three year old company, is 
engaged in the business a£ mortgage banking and brokerage. Its primary 
purpose as a mortgage banker is that of making secured mortgage loans on 
real estate and subsequently transferring and assigning such mortgages to 
interested purchasers under general market conditions. Consolidate Mort¬ 
gage and Investment Company, the second company, is six years old and 
engages in promoting home ownership by providing additional lending media 
in the secondary mortgage market, as distinct from primary mortgage, and 
also in making small loans of consumer credit type. They thus specialize 
in different segments of the real estate mortgage financing activities. 
This study will trace, analyze and interpret the development of 




respective operations and highlight the problems that they encounter in 
their area. 
Specifically, this study will attempt to explain their activities 
ins 
1. Originating real estate mortgages on behalf of, or for the 
purpose of selling to, institutional investors; and 
2. Arranging financing of mortgages to cover the period between 
closing the transaction and actual transfer of the mortgage papers to 
such investors: 
3. Again, the balance sheets of the two companies in this study 
will be carefully studied; partly to show the financial aspects of their 
operations and partly to bring out the problems of finance that they 
experience. 
The expansion of the mortgage financing industry is a peculiar 
phenomenon of our days. And as such, until recently, there have been no 
data, except those of a scattered nature, to which reference might be 
made. Fortunately, the gap in knowledge has been substantially narrowed 
by the pioneering work of Saul B. Klaman in connection with the broad 
investigation of postwar capital market developments under the auspicies 
of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Major dependence is placed 
upon the Klaman study for the factual material persented herein. Specific 
information about the two companies involved was obtained by interviews 
with the following persons: J. T. Bickers, AMB; W. L. Calloway, CMI; 
Q. V. Williamson, connected with both companies; Gladys Lovelace, CMI; 
and A. Barnett, AMB. Other information was obtained by correspondence 
with the University of Georgia. 
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Real estate mortgage financing is a complex and technical process. 
Institutions operating in this field often do not undertake all the aspects 
of the entire financial process. Partly for the kind of specialization 
that financing institutions here represent, partly for the fact that real 
estate mortgage financing is a highly technical activity and partly for 
the fact that no comprehensive account of the real estate mortgage finan¬ 
cing industry as a whole is readily available. The study will present 
a brief account of the major aspects of such financing. This is offered 
also in the hope that this will serve as a prospective to the case studies 
made in Chapter II in which we stucty the mortgage financing industry as a 
whole. 
In order to make the content of this thesis easier understood by 
the reader, the writer will at this point define a few technical terms 
used in this study. 
Definition of Terms 
AMBCQ.—This abbreviation will be used throughout this study for 
Atlanta Mortgage Brokerage Company. 
CMI.—This abbreviation will be used throughout this study for 
Consolidated Mortgage and Investment Company. 
Collateral.—In order to guarantee the payment of a loan to a 
creditor, some evidence of indebtness must be pledged. Real or personal 
property or title deeds, deposited or pledged with a creditor. 
Corporate Securities Underwriter.—Any corporation that has agreed 
to buy at stated terms an entire issue of securities or a substantial 
part thereof for resale to the public. It further guarantees the sale of 
an issue by agreeing to buy from the issuing party any unsold portion at 
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a stated price and agrees to use its best efforts to market ail or part 
of a security issue. 
Federal underwritten.—Federal underwritten is any transaction 
between two or more parties which has been guaranteed or insured by some 
agency of the United States Government. 
Financial intermediaries.—This is any corporation, syndicate or 
individual acting as a mediator for monetary transactions or making a 
temporary expenditure for ownership, part ownership, or other interest in 
some existing capital asset or assets which will be eventually sold to a 
final interested investor. 
Institutional investors.—These are organizations periodically 
having substantial sums of money for investment purposes. The principal 
types are: life insurance companies, educational, charitable and religious 
institutions, foundations, commercial and saving banks, trust companies, 
who have in their possession the funds of individuals and estates, and 
investment trusts. Life insurance companies are the country's largest 
investors in real-estate mortgages as they are also in the field of corp- 
1 
oration bonds and governmental issues. 
Mortgage.—A mortgage is a lien on land, buildings, machinery, 
equipment and other property fixed or movable given by a borrower to the 
lenders as security for his loan; sometimes called a deed of trust or a 
defeasible conveyance. When a mortgage constitutes the security against 
which bonds are issued the lien is conveyed by what is ordinarily known as 
2 
a deed of trust. 
■^Eric L. Kohler, A Dictionary for Accountants, (New York: Prentice- 
Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 22ÏÏI 
^Harold S. Sloan and Arnold J. Zurcher, A Dictionary of Economics 
(New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1961), p. 221. 
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A mortgage bond or note may be designated as "Senior", or "under¬ 
lying," or "first," or "prior," or "overlying," or "second, third," and 
so forth, depending upon the priority of the lien. A mortgage may be 
"closed," that is, its amount may not be altered during its life, or 
"open," which means that the amount borrowed has not reached the Siam 
authorized by the indenture. A mortgage may be a "blanket" or "general" 
mortgage, covering all the fixed and movable property of an enterprise: 
a "chattel" mortgage covers specific movable property onlyj a "develop¬ 
ment" mortgage is where funds are raised for the construction or develop¬ 
ment of property which becomes or remains the underlying security. It 
may be a "consolidated" or "unified" mortgage, meaning that it takes the 
place of several previously existing mortgages. Mortgage obligations 
may become due and payable on a specified date in definite installments 
by way of amortization. They are placed on the balance. sheet of the finance 
company among the long-term liabilities, except that any amount due with¬ 
in the next succeeding year, as well as any accrued interest, is properly 
classified among current liabilities."1" 
Mortgagee.—Mortgagee is one to whom a mortgage is given as se¬ 
curity for funds loaned by him. 
Mortgagor.—Mortgagor is one who gives a mortgage as security for 
funds borrowed. 
Loan correspondents.—Any mortgage company or mortgage banker 
appointed by the ultimate holders of the mortgages to make and service 
their loans. 
Kohler, op. cit., p. 275-276. 
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Municipal bond dealer.—Any corporation, syndicate or individual 
who specialize in buying and selling bonds issued by a city, town, or 
village. 
Originating mortgages.—Originating mortgages is the technical 
process of correlating all information needed for establishing a mort¬ 
gage. In part it covers the entire process of making the funds available. 
For example: examining of title deeds, proof of property ownership, prior 
liens, charges against the property, value of the property and financial 
position of the borrower. 
Paper buying outlets.—This is a term which will be used in this 
writing which has been coined by the writer. It is synonymous in meaning 
with the terms institutional investors, final investor, and final mort¬ 
gages which are corporations, syndicates or individuals having sub¬ 
stantial sums of money for investment purposes. It is felt that the term 
would be more readily grasped by the reader than would be the case if 
institutional investors, etc., were used. 
Policing the mortgage.—This is the process used by the holder of 
a second lien in protecting his interest of a contract that has a prior 
or superior lien. That is, making sure that no legal complications arise 
wherein a foreclosure will occur without his knowledge. If a foreclosure 
should occur without his knowledge, his investment interest in the con¬ 
tract will be loss. 
Portfolio.—Portfolio, for the purpose of this study, is simply 
one's holding of investment in income producing property. 
Second mortgage or junior mortgage operations.—These are operations 
of corporations, syndicates and individuals engaged in the activities of 
providing mortgage funds for mortgagors who are in need of additional 
9 
financing with prior or superior liens on their property to be used as 
security, 
Servicing mortgages.—This process entails the collecting, guarding 
against delinquency, keeping records of, reporting and the submitting of 
funds from the mortgagor to the paper buying outlet by the mortgage banker 
or company. This is a responsibility imposed upon the mortgage banker by 
the paper buying outlet before committing itself to supply the necessary 
funds to the mortgage banker. 
Warehouse banking.—Warehouse banking is a service generally 
rendered by a commercial bank to a mortgage company. This service includes 
advancing the amount of a loan to the mortgagor on mortgages originated by 
the mortgage company. The funds are provided temporarily until such time 
the mortgage company can sell the mortgage to an institutional investor 
or individual and repay the commercial bank. Once the mortgage is sold, 
the buying investor submits a check to the bank for the amount that was 
advanced. For the warehouse service rendered, the warehouse bank charges 
the mortgage company interest on the amount loaned for the period that 
the loan is outstanding. 
CHAPTER II 
REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE FINANCING—AN INDUSTRÏ STUD! 
The mortgage financing industry market may be divided into two 
sectors, primary and secondary. In the primary sector there are many 
institutions interested either in effecting or buying only first mort¬ 
gage contracts for investment purpose with their idle funds. Included 
in this sector are the mortgage bankers. In the secondary sector there 
are private investors interested either in buying or making only second 
mortgage contracts for their own portfolio. These risky investments are 
made with big discounts and high interest rates which increase the pri¬ 
vate investors income derived therefrom. Included in the secondary 
sector are the second or junior mortgage operations. 
In this Chapter we shall discuss from an industry standpoint, the 
development, role and characteristics of the mortgage banker and second 
or junior mortgage operations in financing real estate mortgages. 
Mortgage bankers.—Though calling themselves differently, such as 
"mortgage companies," "mortgage corporations," "mortgage dealers," etc., 
mortgage bankers operate with modest capital which is invested in mort¬ 
gages for final sale to life insurance companies, banks, FNMA, pension 
funds, etc. By turning their capital frequently, retaining servicing 
contracts for the mortgages sold, they build up a profitable business 
from commissions on loans sold and returns from continued servicing 
operations. It is not unusual for such companies to act as loan corre¬ 
spondents for the ultimate holders of the mortgages, originated on their 
10 
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own initiative but with the approval of their principals. 
Mortgage bankers who are thus merchandisers should be distinguished 
from mortgage brokers. The latter renders a different service in this 
field of finance by pointing out to potential lenders opportunities for 
making loans. They invest no capital, close no loans, and perform no 
servicing operations. They merely find lending opportunities for which 
they are paid a finder’s fee in case loans are made as a result of their 
recommendations. It is not uncommon in some markets for real estate 
brokers to be paid finder's fees for directing prospective borrowers to 
institutions anxious to make loans. 
Nature and purpose.—A mortgage company is "typically a closely 
held, private corporation whose principal activity is originating and 
servicing residential mortgage loans for institutional investors. It is 
subject to a minimum degree of federal or state supervision, has a com¬ 
paratively small capital investment relative to its volume of business, 
and relies largely on commercial bank credit to finance its operations and 
mortgage inventory. Such inventory is usually held only for a short in¬ 
terim between closing mortgage loans and their delivery to ultimate in¬ 
vestors 
This definition is accurate as a generalization, although it barely 
suggests the variations that may be found at almost every point. Com¬ 
panies that are approved by the Federal Housing Administration are subject 
to examination and audit by that agency and, in a few cases, states pro- 
2 
vide for the licensing or supervision of mortgage companies. All com¬ 
piles L. Colean, Mortgage Companies: Their Place in the Financial 
Structure (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., Iÿ62), p. 1;. 
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panies are also subject to audit by the institutions with which they do 
business as their correspondent. Again, while it is generally true that 
mortgage companies depend largely on bank credit and carry mortgages on 
their own accounts only for short periods, some companies maintain more 
or less permanent lines of interim credit with nonbank institutions, and 
some accumulate an inventory of mortgages which they may carry from a 
few months to one or more years before final placement with investors. 
While mortgage companies deal predominatly in residential mortgage 
loans, especially in the period after World War II, and, predominatly in 
those insured by the Federal Housing Administration or guaranteed by the 
Veterans Administration, there are a number of companies who deal largely 
or even exclusively with the financing of business property and the non¬ 
insured financing of residential property of both owner-occupied and 
rental types. 
Since the mortgage banker is also a part of the financial market, 
sufih institutions may be distingushed from other comparable financing 
institutions similar, in a way, to those of the municipal bond dealer and 
the corporate securities underwriter, who act as intermediaries between 
borrowers and lenders and carry temporary inventories with the help of 
short-term bank credit. They are similar, in other ways, to those of 
sales finance companies which rely heavily on commercial banks and other 
external financing to extend consumer credit, and carry large inventories 
of net receivables. A mortgage company is unlike these institutions, 
however, in that it operates largely on the basis of prior commitments 
from financial intermediaries, and originates loans primarily to obtain 
accounts for servicing mortgages. It thus maintains a close and con- 
13 
tinuing relationship with institutional investors that has no counter¬ 
part among other types of institutions.'*' 
It is important to distinguish the function of a mortgage company 
from that of a mortgage broker, who is simply an intermediary between 
borrower or originator on the one hand and investor on the other and who 
2 
maintains no continuing responsibility to or with either party. Many 
mortgage companies use the services of brokers to aid in the placement of 
their paper and many also on occasions perform merely a mortgage broker's 
function. Incidentally, many mortgage companies also engage to some degree 
in one or more related lines of business such as insurance, real estate 
brokerage, and building. 
Because of the common failure to make the distinction noted, and 
also because of the fact that the distinction may be blurred in practice, 
it is not possible to make a satisfactory estimate of the number of com¬ 
panies principally engaged in the mortgage banking function. On the basis 
of the records of the Federal Housing Administration and of the Mortgage 
Bankers Association of America, it is estimated that as of 1955 the 
number of mortgage companies was between 865 (the number approved by the 
Federal Housing Administration) and 1,000. The number of such companies, 
therefore, is much smaller than that of commercial banks or savings and 
loan associations, but more than that of mutual savings banks, and about 
3 
the same as that of life insurance companies. While Klaman found that 
^Ibid., p. 6. 
2 
Standard Industrial Classification Manual (Washington: Bureau 
of the Budget, 1957)j p. 178. 
3 
Colean, op. cit., p. 7» 
Il* 
the mimber of mortgage companies had increased during the previous ten 
years by 58 per cent, it is doubtful that any substantial change had 
occurred subsequent to the 1955 estimate. With increasing competition 
and rising costs, new formations appear to have been fewer in late years 
than during the prewar and early postwar years, while the number of mergers 
of companies has been increasing. 
Size and financial structure♦—As a means of measuring their size 
and rate of growth, Klaman classifies mortgage companies according to a- 
mount of assets. He found that for the companies he was able to examine 
as of 1955* about 6b per cent has assets of less than 1 million, slightly 
less than 30 per cent had assets of 1 million to 5 million, and not much 
over Z*.5 per cent had assets of 5 million to 10 million. Less than 1.5 
per cent had assets of over 10 million. He found also a substantial in¬ 
crease of over 1,000 per cent in the total amount of mortgage company 
assets over the period from 191*5 to 1955* a growth about twelvd times 
that of the number of companies. Asset growth appears to haye been 
greatest among companies with less than 1 million and those of over 10 
million of assets than among those in the intermediate ranges mentioned. 
The fact that most of the companies in the class having less than 1 
million in assets have been formed since 191*5 accounts mainly for the 
rapid growth of this class as well as of the industry as a whole. At the 
same time, it may also be noted that a third of the companies in the class 
having more than 10 million in assets were originally established in the 
1 
same period and that only one of this class is more than thirty years old. 
The amount of assets, however, gives only a vague clue as to the 
actual size and character of the operations of mortgage companies, since 
^Klaman, op. cit., p. 12. 
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assets (and corresponding liabilities) may be readily increased by the 
acquisition of mortgages with bank credit. Moreover, a company that made 
loans only on commitment from an investing institution would show less 
assets than one that inventoried loans by the use of bank credit for tin- 
committed future sale, even though the volume of business done might be 
the same in both cases. The growth of assets may thus, in large part, be 
an indication of a rising trend in the use of bank credit rather than of 
an increase in the internal financial base. This conclusion is supported 
by the fact that historically the amount of mortgages held has been prac¬ 
tically equal to the amount of notes payable.^ 
For the same reasons, net worth, if detailed figures were available, 
would likewise be a poor indicator, for the amount of invested capital 
required for the operation of a mortgage company is not necessarily large 
in relation to the volume of business done. According to the evidence com¬ 
piled by Klaman, the ratio of net worth in the aggregate for all companies 
studied to total outstanding amount of mortgages being serviced by them 
2 
in 195i> was only 1.2 per cent. Moreover, there appears to be no close 
correlation between net worth and total assets or between total assets 
and total servicing or between net worth and total servicing. The ability 
of mortgage companies to obtain and utilize outside sources of funds, for 
both short-term and long-term purposes, clearly accounts for this; sit¬ 
uation. 
'•Servicing” volume is the best indicator of both the size and 
3 
character of a mortgage banking institution. The amount of servicing is 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid., p. 11. 
3 
Colean, op. cit., p. 9* 
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one of the main determinants of the true value of a mortgage company 
or an interest therein. Since they operate through "warehousing,” the 
amount of bank credit current is another indicator. 
Of the 1,000 mortgage companies that are members of the Mortgage 
Bankers Association of America (i960), about 28 per cent are currently 
servicing less than $ million dollars worth of mortgages and ii5.5 per 
cent are servicing a volume of under 10 million. Somewhat more than I4O 
per cent of the companies have a volume between 10 million and 50 million 
and Ik per cent have volumes over 50 million. Thirteen companies have 
volumes of more than 200 million; and these are servicing 1*00 million or 
1 
more. Although accurate data are not available, it would appear that 
about half the total volume of mortgages being serviced by mortgage 
companies is being handled by not more than the lU per cent of the com¬ 
panies which service 50 million or more. 
The characteristic financial structure of mortgage companies, with 
its limited demand for invested capital, has made it possible for them 
to be closely held by a few individuals, who in most cases are active 
participants in the business. Conversely, it could be said that the 
fact that mortgage companies are generally closely held aid their owners 
apparently wish to maintain this arrangement, may have had an influence 
on the financial structure. 
Exhibit 1 is a statistical picture of the companies—in the field 
of mortgage financing. Partly because of the traditiond pattern of 
financing—small equity capital and large borrowed finance for temporary 
inventory—return on equity is fairly good. This is especially true 
^Ibid., p. 10 
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Exhibit 1 
Volume of Servicing Number of Percent of 
In Millions) Companies Total Companies 
Under 5 286 28.1* 
5-10 172 17.1 
10-20 193 19-1 
20-30 115 11.1* 
30-1*0 56 5.U 
l*o-5o 1*6 i*.6 
50-75 58 5.8 
75-100 25 2.5 
100-200 Uli h.k 
200-1*00 10 1.0 
1*00- and over 3 .3 
Total 1,008 
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association of America. 
100.0 
when large volume of loans come under FHÀ and VA categories. Given the 
underwriting of risk by governmental agencies, it is not difficult to 
understand why volume of business should increase and that it should be 
a favorite field for small and close knit ownership groups to operate. 
In consequence, we have the picture of a proliferation of snail com¬ 
panies, especially in small volume bracket. 
Any change in the observed pattern may come about only if mort¬ 
gage companies have to go into holding mortgages on their own accounts 
on a large scale basis rather thanact as an agency for ultimate investors 
as of now, or invest in; mortgages on their own accounts for much longer 
periods than is now customary. Such a contingency may, in turn, arise 
on the banking system declining to offer credit lines as now and /or 
ultimate investors like insurance companies ceasing to take continuing 
interest in real estate financing. 
Age, growth, and geographical distribution.—Although a number 
of mortgage companies have spanned more than two generations, the mortgage 
18 
banking companies as they operate today, are comparatively young ones. 
Among the companies that are approved for the origination of FHA in¬ 
sured mortgages, $2 per cent have been established since 19U5» while 
only 29 per cent were formed between 193U (the year in which FHA was 
created) and 19U5» and only 18 per cent of the existing institutions 
1 
were established prior to 193h, of which barely a third antedate 1920. 
The period of most rapid growth in numbers was in the early post¬ 
war years (19U5 to 1955) and was associated with the great attractive¬ 
ness to investors of insured and guaranteed mortgages at that time. 
During this period, both the number of companies and the volume of mort¬ 
gages originated and serviced have continued to grow, although perhaps 
at a lower rate than in the earlier period. 
Whole mortgage companies are located in at least forty-six states 
and the District of Columbia, a concentration in numbers, according to 
Klaman, occurs in the South and the West, with nearly 30 per cent located 
in the heavily populated New Ehgland, Middle Atlantic, and East North 
2 
Central Census regions. Although data later than 195U are not readily 
available, probably little charge in this concentration has taken place 
since Klaman's tally. There was, however, further increase in activity 
in the four principal regions during the postwar period over earlier 
3 
periods. The distribution of the volume of servicing roughly conforms 
u 
to that of the companies. 
In general, it may be said that mortgage companies have been 
■^Klaman, op. cit., p. 20. 
2Ibid. 
3 
Colean, op. cit., p. lU. 
1* 
Klaman, op. cit., p. 27 
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most important and their growth most striking in the most rapidly 
growing areas in the country, which also tend to be the areas which are 
remote from the capital markets of the East and to lack sufficient sources 
of local capital to meet the demand for mortgage loans. It is notable, 
moreover, that the areas of concentration of mortgage company activity 
are roughly the areas where the use of FHA insured and VA guaranteed 
mortgages is most common. It is worthy observing that thanks go to 
FHA and VA, funds from areas of capital surplus have been moving into 
areas of capital shortage, helping the growth of mortgage financing. 
Competitive relationships.—Ease of entry (only $100,000 of capital 
is required for authorization to originate and service FHA insured mort¬ 
gages) has, as the record shows, made for a proliferation of companies , 
as already indicated, with a resultant vigorous competition. The com¬ 
petition among mortgage companies takes two forms: (l) competition for 
mortgage loans, especially for those developed from merchant builder 
operations; and (2) competition for investors. 
In both instances, the competition among mortgage companies appears 
to be mainly on the basis of the quality of service rendered, that is, 
the ability, on the one hand, to assure builders and real estate brokers 
a supply of mortgage funds at such times as they will be needed and to 
arrange construction loans as required, and, on the other hand, to ob¬ 
tain for investors a supply of acceptable mortgage loans and to service 
these competently until paid. Although the: rate of interest on mortgage 
loans is primarily determined by the institutional investor rather than 
the mortgage company, the latter's competitive position is, of course, 
affected by the terms he can obtain from his investors. This situation 
makes it desirable for a mortgage company to have arrangements with a 
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number of investors for the purpose of being able not only to obtain the 
most favorable terms possible at a given time but also to assure regu¬ 
lar availability of funds. 
Competition between mortgage companies aid lending institutions 
of other types varies widely with characteristics of the other institutions. 
For example, since most life insurance companies deal through mortgage 
companies in obtaining and handling their mortgage investments offices, 
the competition here is in respect only to those few companies which do 
not use the good offices of mortgage companies but operate directly 
through their own branch offices. Mutual savings banks also deal widely 
through mortgage companies in acquiring and servicing out-of-state mort¬ 
gages. Outside the areas where mutual savings banks are heavily concen¬ 
trated, the greatest competition to mortgage companies comes from com¬ 
mercial banks and savings and loan associations, vhich are the main 
suppliers of local funds and which usuaLly do their own originating and 
servicing. 
Earnings. —Earnings of mortgage companies (aside from real estate, 
insurance, and other nonmortgage activities) are derived mainly from 
annual servicing fees, originating fees (both based on a percentage of 
the mortgage amounts involved), and net interest earned on mortgages held 
in inventory. Expense consists mainly of wages and salaries, interest 
paid to banks, taxes, rent, and advertising. 
Data on gross nor net earnings of mortgage companies are 
available, and, because of the closely held nature of their stock and 
the active participation of their owners in the business (which sometimes 
blurs the distinction between profit and salary), such data, even if 
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available, would hardly give a true picture of profitability or lack 
of it. Moreover, the admixture, as is commonly the case, of the income 
and expense of mortgage banking operations, strictly defined, with those 
of other activities which such companies may undertake, would make an 
accurate appraisal most difficult. 
On the basis of estimates of total servicing income, subject to 
assumptions, (l) as to the ratio of servicing to other mortgage banking 
income, and (2) the relationship between gross and net income, Klamai 
places the average rate of earnings (after income taxes) on net worth 
in 1955 at around 15 per cent, with a range of 11 per cent to 22 per 
cent, a profit position fairly comparable to that of sales finance and 
consumer finance companies.'*’ 
It may be noted that 1955 was an especially active year for 
financing FHA and VA mortgages and a year in which the spread between 
interest earned and interest paid by mortgage companies was generally 
in their favor. In most recent years, with changing interest rate relation¬ 
ships, declining investor interest in insured and guaranteed mortgages, 
and increasing competition, it may be doubted that profits have generally 
been as high as they were in 1955 and preceding years. Klaman ventures 
no estimate as to the variations in the profitability of large and small 
companies, and there appears to be no settled opinion in the industry on 
this point. 
Second or Junior Mortgage Operation 
Senior mortgages are those whose owners have claims against the 
property superior to other mortgages and some other liens. A senior mort- 
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gage does not necessarily constitute a first claim against the property 
since there may be both legal and contractual claims ahead of it. Taxes 
and other govermentai claims usually take precedence over even senior 
mortgages. 
Junior mortgages are those whose claims are subject to prior mort¬ 
gage claims. Second and sometimes third mortgages are placed against a 
property already covered with a first lien. In times of great speculation 
in land, with frequent transfers and thin equities, even more mortgages 
may be filed against a single piece of property. 
Junior mortgages usually contain two clauses not found in senior 
mortgages. The first, for the protection of the junior mortgagee, gives 
him the right to prevent defaults in prior liens by making the payments 
himself and adding them to his own claim against the property. The second, 
for the protection of the mortgagor—so far as the junior mortgagee is 
concerned—to renew the first mortgage at its expiration or to substitute 
a similar mortgage for it, leaving the junior mortgage in its existing 
relative position. Unless this clause is included in the junior mortgage, 
it may become a senior mortgage automatically if the present senior lien 
is paid off. 
A senior mortgage may contain a subordination clause permitting 
the mortgagor, under stipulated conditions, to place a lien on the pro¬ 
perty superior to the claims of the mortgagee. For example, purchase- 
money mortgages are sometimes taken as part consideration for price of 
vacant lots with the stipulation that their priority will be waived in 
favor of a construction loan, the proceeds of which will be used to con¬ 
struct a building on the premises. 
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Junior mortgages sometimes are written for short periods of 
time—1, 2, or 3 years—resulting in a situation which requires their 
renewal rather than their payment at maturity. The owner of real estate 
who must resort to a second mortgage as a means of financing his property 
usually lacks the means of paying off such a claim at maturity. Partly 
because of the risk involved, second mortgages frequently are made only 
with large discounts as well as high interest charges. For example, if 
the mortgage runs for 1 year the discount may be 10 per cent? 2 years, 
15 per centj and 3 years, 20 per cent. To strengthen this example further, 
we will now look at a mortgage. Mortgagor A has a piece of property 
valued at $20,000. At the present it is mortgaged with Company X for 
$10,000. Later,ti» mortgagor discovers that he needs additional financing 
and goes to Company Y to secure a mortgage loan using the same piece of 
property as collateral that was used to secure the first mortgage. This 
loan from Company Y would be a second mortgage. The face value would be 
$12,000 at 6 to 8 per cent interest. Company Y would deduct $2,000 as a 
discount and remit only $10,000 to the mortgagor. This accounts/or 
clarify for the large discounts and hLgh interest charges. 
Size and financial structure.—An appraisal of the postwar mort¬ 
gage market shows a tremendous growth in the nature and character of the 
market for junior or second mortgage financing. Limited data and market 
observation indicate substantially increase use of junior mortgages since 
World War II. Yet, there is little organized knowledge aid no regularly 
reported information on the volume, nature, and character of the junior 
mortgage market. 
Within the scope of this study, it has been possible to determine 
only in broad outline the salient features of market-participants, pricing 
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and operating techniques, types of mortgages and properties, and re¬ 
lationships of primary and secondary markets. Our knowledge of markets 
for junior mortgage financing needs to be expanded and techniques for 
keeping abreast of current developments in the field needs to be developed. 
In the meantime, an analysis is offered here, based primarily on market 
interviews with professional participants located here in the Atlanta area. 
TABLE 1 
FIRST AND JUNIOR MORTGAGES ON RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES, 
195>0 AND 1956 
1956 ... 1950 
Type of Prop. First 
and Mortgage Mortgage 
(1) 
Junior Percent First 
Mortgage age Ratio Mortgage 








(Amount id billions) 
U.2 3.7 1+2.9 1.5 3.6 
1- to 1+ 
family 99.0 3.2 3.2 35.9 1.2 3.3 
Conventional 55.1 3.0 5.5 21.2 0.76 3.6 
Federally 
underwritten* 1+3.9 0.2 0.1+ U+.7 0.1+3 2.9 
Multifamily 13.1 1.0 7.6 7.0 0.35 5.0 
Total 
(Number in thousands) 
9,l+i+3 821+ 8.7 
1- to U-family 9,172 785 8.6 
Conventional 6,588 1+59 7.0 
Federally 
underwritten* 
(Not available for 1956) 
2,581+ 326 12.6 
Multifamily 271 39 11+.1+ 
*Junior Mortgages refers to VA only. 
Source: Saul B. Klaman, The Postwar Residential Mortgage Market. 
Comperhaisive data on the postwar volume of junior mortgage debt 
secured by residential-but not other-properties are available only for 
1950 and 1956 from the Bureau of the Census. Even for the residential 
sector, since data for those two years do not cover the same categories, 
estimates are necessary. Estimates, shown in Table 1, indicates that the 
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total volume of outstanding junior residential mortgage debt nearly 
tripled between 1950 and 1956 from 1.5 billion to lu 2 billion. The 
increase was about the same as that for outstanding first mortgage debts. 
The 821*,000 junior mortgages in 1950 had probably expanded to well over 
1 million by the end of 1956. 
A more meaningful indication of the postwar growth in junior mort¬ 
gage financing is seen in developments in the conventional, as distinct 
from the federally underwritten, sector. In 1950, a substantial part of 
the outstanding volume of residential junior mortgages were VA guaranteed 
nearly one-half those on owner-occupied one-family properties (Table l), 
and over one-third of those on all one to four-familyproperties (Table 
2). The VA-guaranteed second mortgages were made in combination with an 
FHA-insured first mortgage under a special federal program that was dis¬ 
continued May, 1950. The 50 per cent decline in VA-guaranteed second 
mortgages between 1950 and 1956—from $1*00 million to $200 million—has 
obscured somewhat the real nature of the postwar expansion in basic 
junior mortgage financing. 
The Census Bureau, reporting on financing of owner-occupied one- 
family properties in the 1956 national housing inventory, announced that 
junior mortgage debt increased more slowly than first mortgage debt be¬ 
tween 1950 and 1956* Actually, quite the reverse was true in conventional 
mortgage markets—the only meaningful sector for junior mortgage finance. 
While the number of conventional first mortgages on owner-occupied one- 
family properties increased by little more than 1*0 per cent between 
1950 and 1956, the number of second mortgages more than doubled. The much 
faster growth of second mortgages was not only in dollar amounts but also 
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TABLE 2 
FIRST AND JUNIOR MORTGAGES ON OWNER-OCCUPIED 
ONE-FAMILY UNIT PROPERTIES, 
1950 AND 1956 
1956 1950 
Type of Prop. First Junior Pércent- First Junior Percent- 
and Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage age Ratio Mortgage Mortgage age Ratio 
(1) (2) (2) i (1) 
(3) 
(it) (5) (5) * (h) 
(6) 
(Amount in billions) 
Total 82.8 2.1 2.5 27.7 0.9 3.2 
Conventional 137.5 1.9 5.1 15.2 0.5 3.3 
Federally 
underwritten* 1*5.3 0.2 o.l* 12.5 0.4 3.2 
(Number in thousands) 
Total 12,713 867 6.8 7,052 622 8.8 
Conventional 6,900 7lit 10.3 4,81*0 322 6.7 
Federally 
underwritten* 5,813 513 2.6 2,212 300 13.6 
*Junior Mortgages refer to VA only. 
Sources Saul B. Klaman, The Postwar Residential Mortgage Market 
in number—the latter increasing from 6.7 to 10.3 per cent (Table 2). 
Similarly, the amount of second mortgage debt outstanding on owner-occupied 
one-family properties nearly quadrupled between 1950 and 1956—$0.5 billion 
to $1.9 billion—while the amount of first mortgages only slightly more 
than doubled. 
The growth of junior mortgages on total one- to four-family pro¬ 
perties was estimated to have paralleled that on owner-occupied one-family 
properties. The 3 billion junior mortgage debt outstanding at the end of 
1956 was 5.5 per cent of the amount of first mortgage debt compared with 
3.6 per cent in 1950 (Table 2). Junior mortgages on large-scale resi¬ 
dential properties were a greater proportion of both number and amount of 
first mortgages in 1950 and 1956 than was the case for smaller residential 
units 
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A comparative look at pre-World War II proportions of first and 
second mortgage debt may be instructive. In early 1931; outstanding junior 
mortgage debt was 8.7 per cent of the number and lui; per cent of the 
amount of first mortgages outstanding on owner-occupied properties. Those 
percentages were larger than in 1930. But by the end of 1936, following 
a rapid expansion, junior mortgages were more important relative to first 
mortgages than in 1934. The 1936 proportions of second to first mortgages 
could hardly have been so high as they were during the height of the real 
estate boom in the 1920‘s, however, when FHA and VA programs were unknown 
and low loan-to-value ratio first mortgages were the general rule. 
Without comprehensive data on the volume of junior mortgages out¬ 
standing on nonresidential properties, fragmentary market evidence suggests 
that such financing is at least as important as it is in residential markets. 
Study of one small local mortgage market, for instance, suggests that for 
most years the volume and relative importance of junior mortgages on non¬ 
residential properties were substantially greater than on residential pro¬ 
perties . 
Nature and purpose of junior mortgage financing.—Findings on the 
nature and purpose of second mortgages in different parts of the country 
suggest a number of different explanations. In a study of the Los Angeles 
market it was found that most mortgages on owner-occupied properties were 
created to finance their purchase."*" In Middletown, Connecticut, on the 
other hand, junior mortgage debt placed on properties already owned sub- 
2 
stantially exceeded that incurred for purchase. Second mortgages used 
1Ibid. 
2 
Ibid., p. 280. 
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to finance property purchases in Middletown usually involved transfer of 
funds rather than of credit. In Los Angeles most second mortgages were 
"purchase-money" mortgages taken back by the seller of a property, rather 
than new money furnished by a lender.1 The findings of the present 
limited investigation suggest that on owner-occupied properties, at least, 
most postwar second mortgages were originated as deferred purchase-money 
mortgages in connection with real estate transfers. The Middletown pattern 
may represent a rather specialized case—a small local market isolated 
from outside sources of mortgage funds. The pattern in Los Angeles is 
probably representative of the nature of the present boom in second mort¬ 
gage market activity in our part of the country. 
In the booming real estate and construction market of the twenties, 
the extensive use of junior mortgage financing had a rather definite pur¬ 
pose to supplement first mortgage loans available to buyers from sellers 
only at relatively low loan-to-value ratios. In the post World War II 
decade, the needs of buyers changed. Liberalized mortgage credit under 
federal mortgage programs and changed mortgage lending attitudes among 
private lenders combined to lessen the need for junior mortgages. As 
real estate values rose and equities increased, however, mortgages on 
existing properties were lowered relative to values. New buyers often 
found it necessary to refinance completely or obtain supplementary credit 
to finance purchases. Frequently, the existing first mortgage on a pro¬ 
perty was a long-term low-interest rate FHA or VA loan. Prospective 
purchasers found such mortgages desirable and sellers found that they en¬ 




when interest rates were rising. Transfers of such properties, therefore, 
were frequently made subject (or with assumption of) the existing first 
mortgage supplemented with a purchase-money second mortgage taken back by 
the seller. 
With the generally more liberal financing terms for new than for 
existing properties, many sellers found that a favorable price for used 
property could be obtained only by taking a purchase-money mortgage in 
lieu of cash over the primary mortgage. Even for new houses, however, 
many builders financing construction under conventional mortgages found 
it necessary to take purchase-money second mortgages in order to sell com¬ 
pleted houses. In Los Angles it was found that during I9i>2 and 1953, for 
example, an increasing number of builders and contractors were listed as 
1 
mortgagees in recordings of junior mortgages. 
Purchase-money mortgages have been commonly created, also, in the 
sale of multi-family rental and commercial properties. A large proportion 
of second mortgages created in transfers of such properties, however re¬ 
presented actual transfers of funds from lender to borrower, rather than 
extension of credit from seller to purchaser. Limited information suggests, 
also, that the frequency of second mortgages on those properties initiated 
for loans not associated with purchase was higher than on small residential 
properties. 
Competitive relationship.—The chief source of credit for second 
mortgages, whether of the deferred purchase or money loan type, is the 
individual or the closely-held private corporations. The reason is that 
financial institutions are generally precluded by law from accepting 
^Colean, op. cit., p. 19. 
30 
junior liens on real property, unless they also hold the first liens. 
In 1950, individuals and others held about 85 per cent of the total 
volume of junior mortgage debt outstanding on residential properties.'*' 
The surveys in Los Angeles and Middletown for later years indicate the 
continued dominance of individuals in the market for second mortgages. 
If the 1950 census finding approximated the 1956 situation as well, then 
individuals held an estimated 3.6 billion in second mortgages at the end 
of 1956. This was about one-fourth of the lb. 8 billion in total mort- 
2 
gages held by individuals at the end of 1956. 
Many diverse types of individuals and firms maintain varying pro¬ 
fessional interests in junior mortgages and make a market for them. The 
interests may be incidental to their main activities, sideline invest¬ 
ments, or the primary or sole activity. The chief types of market par¬ 
ticipants are real estate brokers, real estate speculators, mortgage 
brokers, mortgage traders, mortgage investors, and investment syndicates 
under trust arrangements. 
Real estate brokers not infrequently have to find a market for 
purehase-money mortgages in order to negotiate property sales successfully. 
Real estate speculators typically operate by acquiring properties as 
cheaply as possible in all-cash transactions, and selling quickly at the 
highest possible prices by accepting minimum down payments and purchase- 
money mortgages over a new first mortgage. Usually the speculator sells 
his purchase-money mortgages quickly to get cash for continued operations. 
Some mortgage brokers and traders limit their activities essentially 
to transactions in the market for these junior mortgages. While the number 
^TCl aman, 
2Ibid. 
op. cit., p. 290, 
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of such operators is unknown, they seemed to be few relative to the volume 
of transactions. Brokers in second mortgages perform the same functions 
as brokers in the primary mortgage markets by bringing buyers and sellers 
together for a price. Traders, on the other hand, operate by actually 
acquiring second mortgages with their own funds and reselling generally 
to individual investors for a profit. 
Investors in second mortgages comprise several different types of 
individuals and firms. Professional investors acquire mortgages for their 
own portfolios, either by purchasing already created second purchase- 
money mortgages or lending funds directly on the security of junior pro¬ 
perty liens. Investment-minded individuals acquire second mortgages oc¬ 
casionally for a supplementary income or, if retired, for major income. 
The investment syndicates, which individuals pool funds to acquire second 
mortgages, usually organize as corporations by an attorney or accountant 
who generally acquires and manages investments under a trust arrangement. 
Market organizations and techniques.—Diverse group of participants 
play their roles in this highly specialized, widely scattered and localized 
markets. Transactions in primary and secondary markets are closely related, 
and little organization exists in either market. Primary transactions are 
essentially of two typesî execution of a purchase-money mortgage between 
buyers and sellers of property; and actual raising of funds on the se¬ 
curity of property. The professional mortgage broker, trader, or investor 
plays a fundamental role in both types of transaction; in execution of a 
purchase-money mortgage, he is part of the immediate primary transaction; 
in the other case, he is a necessary link as provider of funds. 
Sources of funds for second mortgages, largely noninstitutional, 
are usually not known to prospective borrowers. Accordingly, the services 
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of a mortgage broker are generally essential to any junior mortgage trans¬ 
action. He typically maintains a classified file of investor clients ob¬ 
tained chiefly through advertisements, circular letters, and word-of- 
mouth. The broker's fee paid by the borrower for placing second mort¬ 
gages varies with the amount of loan and between cities. In one large 
Eastern city# typical fees are 2 per cent for the first ?P50,000 of loan 
and 1 per cent for the rest. For small loans, the -percentage charge is 
much higher to provide a minimum fee, usually set by the broker. 
A major deterrent in placing mortgages in many states is restrictions 
on interest rates allowed under existing usury laws. In regard to FHA and 
Yk mortgages, the agencies rule the interest rate. The problem of interest 
rate, therefore, arises only in respect of conventional and second mort¬ 
gages. Maximum interest rates under those laws vary widely between states, 
from 6 per cent in Washington, D. C. and New York, to 10 per cent in 
Florida and California, and 12 per cent in Connecticut. In some states 
corporations may not plead usury, and hence corporate owners of property— 
usually large-scale multi-family and commercial—-can borrow on second 
mortgages more easily than individuals can. In states where usury rates 
are low relative to yields in the open market, individuals can negotiate 
direct money loans only by giving to lenders large discounts and through 
such devices circumvent the intent if not the letter of laws. 
Because of interest rate limitations that operate many brokers and 
traders and investor prefer to confine their activities to the secondary 
market. Those transactions involve chiefly purchase-money mortgages, on 
which effective yields are raised substantially above contract interest 
rates through discount and bonus provisions. The active secondary market 
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exists because purchase-money mortgages created in primary transactions 
are often not retained by the individual sellers of property or real 
estate speculators. Rather than hold such mortgages created as part of 
real estate purchases, the individual sellers of property or real estate 
speculators seek to convert them into immediate cash through real estate 
and mortgage brokers, mortgage traders, or directly through sale to known 
investors.^- Ultimate investors are located in the way already described 
for the primary market. 
Marketing techniques vary widely among professional operators. 
Brokers rely either upon circularized notices listing mortgage offerings 
with details on prices, outstanding balances, underlying properties, 
first mortgage characteristics, rents and expenses (for income-properties) 
or upon attempts to make the brokerage offices into organized market 
places with mortgage offerings available. Some mortgage traders have 
adopted programs of selling second mortgages to individuals under re¬ 
purchase agreements. The mortgage trader warrants to repurchase, at the 
request of the final investor, any second mortgage which was sold to him 
became defaulted for at least forty-five days at the original sale price 
minus principal payments received. 
Both brokers and traders depend for their supply of second mort¬ 
gages upon realtors, builders, and speculators who find it necessary to 
arrange Junior financing. Recently, realtors, builders and speculators 
have increasingly used the advance commitment technique, basic in the 
market for first mortgages. The second mortgage broker or trader, for 
example, makes an advance commitment (after the usual inspections and 
1 
Colean, op. cit. p. 27. 
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approval) to a real estate operator or builder to buy or find a market 
for purchase-money second mortgages created in a real estate trans¬ 
action. 
Prices and terms of junior mortgages.—Commonly, a second mortgage 
transaction is made at a specified contract interest rate, combined with 
a discount or "bonus" on the face value of the note given by the seller 
or borrower to the investor. The discount is almost always a part of 
1 
secondary market transactions. It is also frequently used in primary 
markets, where maximum interest rates under usury laws restrict changing 
the market rate on the basis of yields on investment. Occasionally, 
contract interest rates truly reflect yield, but evidence on this point is 
not readily available in public or other records. The reported rates on 
second mortgages are only a little higher than rates on conventional first 
mortgages is explained in large part by use of thetechnique of discounting 
to by-pass usury laws. 
Prices of second mortgages vary widely between and within local 
markets. Many characteristics of second mortgage markets contribute to 
varying prices for mortgages of similar quality: their local character, 
the limited organized outlets and investors, and the lack of knowledge 
of nonprofessional participants seeking to sell purchase-money mortgages. 
Varying prices are also attributable to the imperfect nature of the 
market and to the varying quality of the paper. Quality of so imperfect 
a product is often a matter of individual judgment. Professional inves¬ 
tors, however, generally look to the same set of criteria in establishing 
prices for second mortgages as in the case of first mortgages. 
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The location of the property is of obvious importance because of 
the variation in state foreclosure laws. In addition to the obvious 
bearing on the kind and condition of the property, higher rating is 
usually given for second mortgages on income yielding properties. Owners 
are often corporations with favorable credit ratings—-essential for 
marketing a second mortgage at almost any price. In addition, the value 
of such properties can be ascertained in relation to income produced. 
The terms of both the first and second mortgages are important 
in determining the quality of junior liens. The terms of the first have 
an effect since inability of the borrower to carry first mortgage payments 
jeopardizes the secuzity of the second. If the second mortgage is not 
fully amortized at maturity,the remaining balance and length of life of 
the first mortgage may be decisive when the second mortgage becomes 
due and payable. If the first mortgage may be easily refinanced to pro¬ 
vide funds to pay off junior lien, the quality of the second mortgage is 
enhanced. The terms of the second mortgage directly affect its quality 
in the market. The longer the maturity and the larger the proportion of 
the loan remaining to be paid off at maturity, the larger the discount. 
The higher the contract rate of interest, the lower the discount.^" 
The amount of equity a second mortgage borrower has in his pro¬ 
perty is a major consideration. It is a measure of protection against 
declines in real estate values. It is also a measure of the borrower's 
interest in maintaining ownership, especially in bad times. The amount 
of the second mortgage note sometimes influences the rate of discount, 
because small notes at rates equal to rates on larger ones are not 
^KLaman, op. cit., p. 2k5* 
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acceptable to investors when each involves equal quality and servicing. 
A seasoned mortgage that has proved its soundness will command a higher 
price than one recently created. 
The wide range of quality factors and other market imperfections 
in the second mortgage market lead to wide variation in prices and yields. 
Yields, as noted earlier, are a function of the contract interest rate, 
discount, and maturity. Limited observations indicated that, in late 
1956, with contract interest rates between 5 and 8 per cent, discounts on 
second mortgages secured by owner-occupied properties ranged from 2 to 6 
» 
per cent per year of remaining maturity and on those secured by income 
properties between 2 1/2 and h per cent per year.^ Within the range of 
typical maturities this means the total discounts ran from a. low of 6 to 
9 per cent to a high of i;0 to 50 per cent, resulting in yields to inves¬ 
tors of from 8 to 25 per cent. Yields in the 10 to 15 per cent range seemed 
quite common in secondary markets that was investigated. The high yields 
may be regarded as compensation for unusual risks and conditions prevailing 
in the second mortgage markets imperfect knowledge of the market3 limited 
loanable funds; borrowers’ need for credit not available from firancial 
institutions; and the willingness of sellers, able to obtain inflated 
prices for properties on the basis of purchase-money mortgages, to dis¬ 
count such mortgages heavily for cash. 
Junior mortgages on most types of property carry maturities ranging 
between 3 and 12 years, considerably shorter than maturities of first 
mortgages. The 1950 Census survey figures indicate that the median term 
on conventional junior mortgages on owner-occupied properties acquired 
1Ibid. 
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in 19lt9 and 1950 was 5 years, compared with 11 years on conventional 
junior mortgages. Only one-eighth of conventional junior mortgages were 
written for maturities of 15 years or more, compared with over one-fourth 
on conventional first mortgages. The difference between terms on the two 
types of conventional mortgages was somewhat narrower on rental proper¬ 
ties. Apparently, since 1950 maturities on junior mortgages have shown 




Required amortization on junior mortgages increased markedly be¬ 
tween 1950 and 1956, just as it had for first mortgages. Census data 
show that regular payments on principal were called for on 82 per cent 
of conventional second mortgages outstanding on owner-occupied one- 
2 
family houses at the end of 1956, compared with 70 per cent in 1950. 
Comparable figures for conventional first mortgages were 91 and 78 per 
cent respectively. A small proportion of rental property mortgages— 
firsts and seconds—are regularly amortized. 
In this Chapter our attention has been focused on the mortgage 
banking and second mortgage operations. We now turn to the two companies 
in this study, Atlanta Mortgage Brokerage Company, a mortgage banking 
operation and Consolidated Mortgage and Investment Company, a second 
mortgage operation. 
*Colean, op. cit., p. 1^0. 
2 
KLaman, op. cit., p. 21^6 
CHAPTER HI 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
COMPANIES INVOLVED IN THIS STUDY 
In this Chapter, the history and growth of the two companies and 
the general nature of their operations will be presented. 
The Atlanta Mortgage Brokerage Company 
In the year of I960, Bickers, the owner of a realty company, con¬ 
sidered the idea of opening a mortgage brokerage company. His association 
with commercial banks and other lending institutions gave impetus to the 
promotion of this idea further. An attempt then was made to get the sup¬ 
port of local associates Which proved to be encouraging. The next step 
was to secure substaintial outlets for final placement of the investment 
portfolio• 
Bickers, in his attempt to establish outlets for the placement of 
mortgage papers, had the problem of finding an institution or institutions 
large enough and willing to establish enduring relationship with the con¬ 
templated company for the purpose. Such an outlet was finally obtained 
in North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company. 
With the outlet now available, a group was formed which consisted 
of Bickers, J. B. Harris, Q. V. Williamson, Herman J. Russell, Gladys 
Powell, Charles L. Shorter, and J. C. Johnson. One hunder twenty seven 
thousand dollars was contributed from personal savings of the group for 
initial financing. Rules and regulations were drawn up by this group and 
application was submitted to Federal Housing Administration to become 
chartered. Within three months period, the charter was obtained. 
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The organizers then sought out banks that would serve as a "ware¬ 
house" for the mortgage papers. The Trust Company of Georgia was finally 
decided upon. The bank gave them a line of credit of $100,000 minimum on 
committed papers (those papers which a buying outlet has agreed to pur¬ 
chase) during the first year of operation. 
Ordinarily, a mortgage bank operates for five to six years in the 
red. But AMBCG started making profit from the second year of its existence 
and has done so ever since. The main reason for this successful year of 
operation was due to management's ability to reduce expenses. Overhead 
and administrative expenses were kept to a minimum. This was achieved by 
promoters contributing their services to the company with little or no 
salaries or wages. 
Because of this successful first year of operation, The Trust Com¬ 
pany of Georgia gave them a new line of credit of $100,000 maximum on un¬ 
committed papers (those papers which have not yet been placed with a 
buying outlet for their purchase) and one million dollars on all committed 
papers. During this time, the company also established relationship with 
two New York banks. A line of credit of one million for the Atlanta com¬ 
munity and ten million for the entire state of Georgia was obtained. 
The Atlanta Mortgage Brokerage Company has grown from a capitalisation 
of $127,000 to the present capitalization of $150,000 in about four years. 
It has, over this period, a volume of business of more than one million in 
loans to its credit. What is even more, they have placed the same amount 
with their buying outlets. The company hopes to reach the $500,000 capital¬ 
ization mark with a view to strengthen: (1) funds for conventional loansj 
and (2) the equity base of their capitalization structure. 
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The authorized stock is 100,000 common shares. However, only 
17»826 shares have been registered with, and registration fee paid to the 
Securities Commissioner of the State of Georgia. Of these 5>328 shares 
herein the original stockholders characterized as stock already sold. 
Twelve thousand five hundred shares is the number of shares offered to 
the public. 
The common stock of the corporation has a par value of $10 per share, 
and is offered to the public at $20 per share. The stock is entitled to 
dividends only as declared by the Board of Directors and each holder of 
$10 per value common stock of the corporation is entitled to one vote for 
each share of stock standing in his name on the books of the corporation. 
The company's total assets have grown from $127,079.50 to $323,588.66 
dollar wise. This is a $195,309.16 increase which shows that its assets 
has grown over 1.56 times or 156 per cent in a period of 3 years. 
From the initial stage of the company to the present, the growth of 
this company can be attributed to its stockholders. This is because they 
looked upon the company as a growing institution and have not pressured 
the Board of Directors into declaring dividends. Therefore, all income of 
the company, flowing from its operation, has been plowed back into the 
organization. 
Though AMBCO has been in existence for only three years and thus 
has a brief history, its progress has been remarkable. Indeed, the manage¬ 
ment hopes to make the institution a great financial asset to the Atlanta 
community by providing increasing outlets for mortgage funds of insurance 
companies, pension funds, fraternal organizations, labor unions, individuals 
and other organizations. 
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Characteristics of opérâtions.--Atlanta Mortgage and Brokerage 
Company as the name implies, would seem to be essentially a brokerage 
i 
company. The company is not however just a mortgage brokerage, but is 
also a mortgage banker. This distinction is significant and interesting. 
It is well understood in the field. The distinction may be made clear 
by reference to appropriate authority. As Hoagland in his book entitled, 
"Real Estate Principles," and Klaman in his book entitled, "The Postwar 
Rise of Mortgage Companies," state, a mortgage broker renders a service 
in the field of mortgage financing by pointing out to potential lenders 
opportunties for making loans. They invest no capital, close no loans, 
and perform no servicing operations. They merely find lending opportunities 
for which they are paid a finder's fee in case loans are made as a result 
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of their recommendation. On the other hand, a mortgage banker is a typi¬ 
cal closely held, private corporation whose principal activity is origi¬ 
nating and servicing residential mortgage loans for institutional inves- 
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tors. It is subject to a minimum degree of federal or state supervision, 
has a comparatively small capital investment relative to its volume of 
business, and relies largely on commercial bank credit to finance its ope¬ 
rations and mortgage inventory. Such inventory is usually held only for 
a short interim between closing mortgage loans and their delivery to ulti¬ 
mate investors. 
The two institutional investors standing behind AMBCO are North 
Carolina Mutual Insurance Company of Durham and the Savings Bank of New 
York acting as buying outlets for the mortgages originated by AMBCO. For 
1 
Hoagland, op. cit., p. 26U. 
2Ibid. 
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the servicing activity performed by AMBOO for North Carolina Mutual Inc., 
in connection with mortgages taken up by them, they are paid l/2 of 1 
per cent. For the services performed by AMBCO on behalf of the other 
company it is paid 3/8 of 1 per cent. The Savings Bank of New York was 
brought into the fold as a buying outlet in 1962. However, the state 
laws of New York do not permit the bank to be a general outlet except 
for only the FHA and VA loans. The laws of New York states in part 
that no investment of this nature can be made outside of a radius of $0 
miles of the state of New York unless the loan is government insured. 
AMBOO*s operation requires further explanation. Essentially, a 
mortgage banker, the company merely has its doors open to those who are 
in need of funds for developing and building homes. At present, AMBCO*s 
principal activity is originating and servicing three types of residen¬ 
tial mortgage loans but for final placement with the two institutional 
investors. The tree types of residential mortgages originated and ser¬ 
viced are FHA, VA and Conventional loans. A better understanding of 
AMBCO*s operations can be gained if the basic principles applicable to 
their operation are briefly described. 
Loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration.—The Federal 
Housing Administration, better known as FHA, was organized under authority 
contained in the National Housing Act passed by Congress in 193U. In 
191*7» FHA was made a part of Housing and Home Finance Agency. From time 
to time, Congress makes changes in laws affecting FHA and the organization 
itself revises its rules and regulations as conditions demand change. 
FHA isan insuring agency and not a lending agency. Its insured 
loans my be held only by corporations approved and designated by it as 
"approved mortgagee." All such institutions that are supervised by the 
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government must possess funds of at least $25,000. Corporation not so 
supervised must have funds of at least $100,000. Any one seeking an 
FHA insured loan must file his loan application with an approved mort¬ 
gagee, not the FHA. 
The following information is required by AMBCO before it will 
forward any loan application to FHA for insurance as provided by the 
Administration: 
1. Mortgagor's application. 
2. Description of the property. 
3. Verification of employment of borrower. 
U. Verification of the borrower's bank balance. 
5. Plans aid specifications (new construction). 
6. Copy of the sale contract. 
7. Statement of FHA appraisal. 
8. Credit report on borrower. 
Generally speaking, similar basic information as disclosed by 
the above items, is also required by the proposed lender in processing 
any other type of real estate loan. This information merely gives the 
insuring agency and the mortgagee an idea of the type of individual they 
are dealing with, the location, size and value of the property, the amount 
of income the applicant has, his other sources of funds, type of struct¬ 
ure he plans to build, his interest in the property, the appraisal value 
and then the net worth of the borrower. These papers further serve to 
show the insuring agency and the mortgagee if they will get their invest¬ 
ment back in the form of monthly installments. Despite the security, the 
ability of the borrower (mortgagor) is examined. The reason is simple. 
The FHA loans are generally for encouraging home ownership and their 
development. So, FHA would not like to rely on foreclosure, if it can 
avoid it 
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On the basis of the application and the items listed above, the 
FHA sends to AMBCO the statement of insurance which shows the anount that 
FHA will insure. When this statement is received by AMBCO, the loan com¬ 
mittee meets to vote on making the loan. If the loan is agreed to be 
made, there are two routes AMBCO may follow. First, the deal can be 
close without any commitment from their usual buying outlets. At this 
point, AMBCO may obtain the funds through warehousing with The Trust 
Company of Georgia and then sell the contract to one of their buying 
outlets at leisure. Second, it may obtain a commitment from one of their 
buying outlets by offering the mortgage contract first to the Savings 
Bank of New York, close the deal, and then warehouse the loan through the 
Trust Company of Georgia. Which ever route is taken, the same procedure 
is followed: AMBCO takes the mortgage contract to the Trust Company of 
Georgia, the first instance, who as warehouse banker gives AMBCO a check 
for the amount of the transaction against the mortgage document. The check 
is then given to the mortgagor who goes on his way knowing that he must 
meet his monthly installments to AMBCO. After ail red tape is completed, 
the buying outlet forward their check to the Trust Company of Georgia 
and pick up the mortgage document. For the advance by the Trust Company 
of Georgia , AMBCO pays 3 l/2 to 1; per cent per annum interest charge. 
Though the buying outlet is now the real mortgagee, AMBCO will remain in 
in the picture as the agent servicing the loan for which it gets 1/2 of 
1 percent of the value of the transaction as remuneration. 
Loans Guaranteed by the Veterans Administration.—VA real estate 
loans are those authorized by the Servicement *s Re-Adjustment Act of 
19UU, commonly called the GI Bill of Rights. Under this Act and its 
amendments, the United States Government, through the Veterans Admin- 
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istration, make it possible for a Veteran of World War II and the Korean 
Conflict to purchase a home without a down payment. Originally the 
Veterans Administration Guaranteed 5>0 per cent of the indebtness but not 
more than $U,000. Presently, the VA guarantees 100 per cent of the in¬ 
debtness but not more than f2^,000 for each loan. The lender may at his 
discretion accept less than the maximum guaranty; for example, where a 
veteran has had a previous loan aid thus used part of his entitlement. 
The mortgagee may be an institution or individual. In those areas where 
financing is difficult, the VA sometime makes the VA loans directly to 
the veteran. The mortgage terms may be as long as 30 years. The interest 
is currently 5> 1/U per cent per annum. Principal and interest must be 
paid monthly in equal installments to AMBCO, together with one twelfth of 
the annual taxes and hazard insurance permium which are deposited in 
escrow accounts. AMBCO holds the escrow accounts to pay taxes and in¬ 
surance premiums as they become due. The loan may be repaid in whole 
or in part at any time, without penalty, but in sums not less than the 
monthly installment. 
The Veterans Administration will not guarantee a loan if the 
proposed loan is in excess of the value of the property as determined by 
a VA authorized appraiser and certified by the VA. Until August 1, 1955» 
VA loans were often made in the amount of the market value and approved 
by the VA. 
If a VA loan is not made directly by the Veterans Administration, 
which is generally the case, it is serviced by an established lending 
institution who is on the "approved mortgage" list of FHA. Atlanta 
Mortgage Broker is such an institution and act as agents for the holders 
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of the mortgages, their buying outlets. 
Information to be funished the VA in support of loan applications 
are, in the main, the same as those customarily furnished the FHA, re¬ 
ferred to previously. Once this information has been forwarded to the 
VA the same procedure is followed as with the FHA insured mortgage loan. 
Conventional loans.—The term "conventional" is customarily applied 
to all real estate mortgage loans which are not guaranteed or insured by 
some agency of the United States Government, irrespective of the type of 
security involved.^ Prior to the depression years of the early thirties 
all real estate mortgage loans were of this type, although they were not 
then so classified. Very few loans were for more than ï> years. Some were 
made payable in full at maturity, with only interest payable periodically, 
and others provided for principal reductions either semi-annually or 
annually. There was usually a large sum due at maturity which had to be 
either paid in full, extended or replaced by a refinancing mortgage. The 
latter measure entailed additional brokerage and closing costs at each 
maturity time. A further hardship, and often a fatal one, was that in 
times of economic adversity, often there was the inability to obtain 
indulgence of refinancing. Especially was this true during the depression 
days of the early thirties when money was so scarce. The mortgagor, there¬ 
fore, was faced with the legal obligation of paying in full. Many pro¬ 
perty owners could not do so and many mortgage holders were compelled to 
foreclose. Institutional lenders, such as insurance companies, banks, 
individuals, etc., were most considerate with mortgagors, giving them 
every opportunity to enter into modification agreements which are sub- 
^The Real Estate Board of Memphis, op. cit., p. 86-87. 
sequent agreements arranged in such a way to afford the borrower an 
an opportunity to pay back the loan. But the need of cash funds on the 
part of lenders and the lack of it by borrowers led to many foreclosures 
and resultant repossessions. Inasmuch as conventional loans bear no 
government insurance or guaranty, the borrower's security is usually re- 
1 
quired to be fairly substantial. 
Under most state laws, insurance companies are limited to loans 
not exceeding 66 2/3 per cent of the property's appraised value. As a 
2 
further precaution the terms of conventional loans are usually shorter. 
Due to the above fact, all conventional loans handled by AMBCO 
has had to be treated in a different perspective from FHA and VA. For 
examples once the conventional loan application is made by the mort¬ 
gagor all that is needed is a credit report, appraisal of the real pro¬ 
perty, title policy and a survey of the land. Once this infromation is 
completed, the loan oommittee meets to give temporary approval for making 
the loan. The contract, however, is not closed until North Carolina 
Mutual, the only buying outlet for AMBCO conventional loans, has made its 
commitment—the other outlet, the Savings Bank of New York, cannot make 
investments in mortgages of this nature as has been stated previously. 
Once the commitment has been received, it goes to the Trust Company of 
Georgia for the advance loan which is made at an interest rate of U to 
5> per cent. When the mortgage is finally sold to North Carolina Mutual 
they in turn forward a check to the Trust Company of Georgia. Therefore, 
AMBCO does not handle any money other than the monthly installments. In 
U8 
the case of FHA and VA loans, the agencies immediately come into the 
picture; they determine the appraisal of properties against which loans 
are made and the loans are obviously secured as compared to the conven¬ 
tional loans. 
There are other types of mortgages that could be originated and 
serviced by Atlanta Mortgage Brokerage Company but at the present they 
have not chosen to do so. 
To sum ups AMBCO is a young institution but has made consider¬ 
able progress and promise to grow further. Approved institution of the 
FHA and VA, AMBCO is also interested in conventional mortgage loans. That 
is the way the young institution has been able to establish buying outlets 
with big institutions like North Carolina Insurance and at the same time 
obtain fairly high credit line from banks-—these speak eloquently of manage¬ 
ment's talents of the institution. 
Consolidated Mortgage Investment Company 
In the early part of 1956, W. L. Calloway, then owner of Calloway 
Realty Company became interested in organizing a mortgage and investment 
company. His interest was influenced by his association with, and ob¬ 
servations of the operations of financial institutions in the downtown 
area. He realized that money could be made from second mortgages if it 
were possible to get enough money to put the idea into operation. He 
contacted associates whom he thought would be interested in promoting the 
idea further. 
At a meeting composed of interested persons, a total of $18,000 
was contributed from personal savings of the group for the initial finan¬ 
cing of the proposed company. During which time, rules and regulations 
were drawn up and an application to operate was applied for. On May U, 
1956, Consolidated Mortgage became an organized corporation existing 
under the laws of the State of Georgia. The charter of this corporation 
encompasses the buying, selling, owning, leasing, developing, constructing, 
repairing and renting of real and personal property; the making of loans 
and advancing of credit or money on personal property. However, the 
primary purpose of this company is to promote home ownership by providing 
additional lending media which will prove beneficial both to prospective 
home owners and profitable to the stockholders of the company. 
Stock was issued for acquiring equity capital. It consisted of 
18,750 shares of $U.OO par value class "A” common capital stock. All 
stock was to be sold at $5*00 per share and none to be sold at less than 
that price. The shares were fully paid. 
The stock was to be sold only by officers, directors and employees 
of the company who would be under contract and the direct supervision of 
the company. Only the territory of the State of Georgia was contemplated 
and the company's operation does not extend beyond the boundaries of this 
State. However, the oompany would expand to other areas for investment 
purposes, in the future, if it deems the expansion profitable to its 
stockholders. 
Three years after CMI begun its operations as the first financial 
institution in the second mortgage field, its assets, starting with a paid 
in capital of $18,200, showed a rapid growth, and stood at over $110,000* 
Realizing a second vital need in the community, CMI took funds from its 
second mortgage field and announced to the public its plans to move into 
the small loan area. The main reason for this decision was the recognition 
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of the need for quick-cash turn-over in this field and that they helped 
diversify their operations, helping to achieve an equilibrium between 
their mortgage loans and short-term investment in the form of the 90 
day loans. At the annual meeting of stockholders held July 7, 1959» 
it was decided that the second mortgage purchasing be curtailed until 
such time as the small loan office opened its doors and was underway. On 
August 1, 1959» the small loan office opened its doors with the idea of 
serving thousands of people who regularly supplemented their incomes and 
met emergencies through the making of small loans. Consolidated Mortgage 
has carried on the small loan business under expert management and in 
complete compliance with the laws of the Georgia Industrial Loan Act. 
It offers efficient, confidential and prompt service in this area. 
Exhibit 2 
Record of Growth 
Capital Unearned Ins., Fees, Total 
Years Stock Loans Interest & Discounts Assets 
1956 $ 18,200.00 $ 18,200.00 
1957 25,750.00 29,585.21* 11,558.81* ia, 637.1*2 
1958 3U,700.00 66,61*5.1*5 30,239.20 71,1*56.57 
1959 1*9,1+60.00 98,701*.35 1*3,018.72 110,102.28 
I960 86,183.00 121*,993.19 1*6,1*1*8.77 152,823.37 
1961 110,3^8.75 155,269.25 55,956.57 256,896.95 
1962 111*, 1*88.12 212,722.35 76,981+.91 312,321.89 
1963 123,530.63 209,128.1*9 77,576.1*6 315,961*.66 
According to CMI's record of growth, Exhibit 2, from 1956 to 
1963» it can be seen that the company was steadily growing dollar-wise. 
The rate of growth is given in Exhibit 3« The company had a decrease of 
activity in the Loans Department only in 1963 when loans decreased in 
relationship to the previous by 1.71. Percentage wise, Exhibit 3, the 
company's overall rate of growth is decreasing. This is to be reasonably 
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Exhibit 3 
Rate of Growth 
(Percentage) 
Capital Unearned Ins., Fees, Total 
Years Stock Loans Interest & Discounts Assets 
1956 
1957 ill 128 
1958 3k 125 161 71 
1959 kz U8 U2 5U 
I960 7k 26 7 38 
1961 28 2k 20 68 
1962 3 37 37 21 
1963 7 (1.71) .07 1 
expected in that as activity increases, further growth tends to be 
increasingly difficult. 
Interesting questions arising are: why did CMI switch to small 
loans at the expense of the growing second mortgage business? Was it 
the shortness of funds at its disposal? Or, was it the management's 
feeling that they were going into deeper commitments in the second 
mortgage operation and wanted to get better diversification of its invest¬ 
ment portfolio? Again, how does the samll loan activity tie in with real 
estate mortgage operation? The questions are difficult to answer in the 
absence of sufficient data. 
In 1961 the company purchased the home office property and brought 
the company assets up to a quarter of a million dollars as can be seen 
in Exhibit 2. In 1962, the assets increased by another $50,000 and 
negotiations were started on securing a new line of credit for the small 
loans department. The company, contemplating expansion, acquired a site 
to build a future branch on the west side of the city. These were the 
goals outlined for 1962 at the annual meeting of the stockholders. 
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Improved financing, another objective, was accomplished by two 
procedures: (l) the sale of the remaining unsold stock was stepped up 
after the January dividends were paid, and (2) funds acquired by fore¬ 
closure of three parcel of properties being reinvested in additional 
mortgages. 
Securing a new line of credit for the small loan department, a 
second objective, was achieved with a minimum amount of negotiation. 
Standard Factor and Finance Company approved a $100,000 line of credit 
confined strictly to the small loans department. 
The third object, acquisition of a West Side site for the opening 
of the West Side Branch Office of CMI was started when the company pur¬ 
chased property located on the west side of the city. The branch office 
is now under construction and completion is contemplated by early fall. 
The future plans for the company are to help additional growth 
of the small loans department, mortgage department, and a minimum of 
$50,000 increased in the company's total assets. The groundwork is also 
being laid for the main item on the company's future program which is 
establishing a mortgage correspondent department and brokerage wing which 
will further help diversification of the operations of the company. To 
sum up CMI: it started with two of the functions in the second mortgage 
financial operations. However, due to a shortage of working capital, the 
making of second mortgages had to be dropped. It then diversified its 
operations further by bringing in the small loans department. Further 
diversification is now being contemplated through the establishment of 
a mortgage correspondent department which will be a big step toward the 
ultimate goal of this company which is to operate in all areas of 
mortgage financing. 
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Policies and operations»—CMI originally was set up with the 
objective of handling two of the second mortgage operations. They are 
(l) making second mortgages, that is, lending money on the security 
of junior property liens, and (2) buying the second mortgage papers, s. 
which is purchasing already created second purchase-money mortgage from 
second parties who were in need of ready cash and could not wait for 
the maturity or complete collection cycle. These two functions 
incidentally, are integral in the overall second mortgage operations and 
fall into the professional investors category which is acquiring mortgages 
for their own portfolios, either by purchasing already created second 
purchase-money mortgages or lending funds directly on the security of 
junior property liens. 
Consolidated Mortgage and Investment Company continued their 
planned operations for a year. At the end of this first year's operations, 
a shortage of funds prevailed. This fund shortage was due to (l) a 
weak portfolio and (2) the diversified operations being used by CMI. To 
alleviate this fund shortage, management, along with the Board of Directors, 
decided to discontinue the making of second mortgages in favor of only 
buying second mortgage papers. 
CMI Company is presently engaged in two functions: (l) buying second 
mortgages for their own portfolio and (2) the making of small loans to 
necessitous individuals to supplement their incomes and meet emergencies. 
A better understanding of GMI's first function, buying second 
mortgages for their own portfolio, can be gained through the following 
■4daman, op. cit., p. 233. 
example. Four parties are involved in this transaction: party A (the 
mortgagor), party B (the second mortgagee), party C (CMI), and party D 
(the first mortgagee). The transaction starts with party A, who with 
a first mortgage already in the fold for the purpose of buying or building 
a home, needing additional funds goes to party B, who is in the business 
of making second mortgages, and secure a second mortgage using the same 
assets as collateral for the second mortgage as were used for the first 
mortgage. Party B in need of funds for other reasons cannot hold party 
A’s second mortgage for collection nor for maturity* therefore, party B 
takes the second mortgage paper to party C (CMI), who is in the business 
of buying second mortgage papers and contracts to sell the paper. Party 
C (CMI) buys party A’s second mortgage paper from party B maintaining the 
same interest rate but maybe at a 50 to 80 per cent discount. Party G 
(CMI) contracts party D and informs him that they are holding a second 
mortgage, which is junior to his first mortgage on the same assets used 
as collateral by party A. Party C would also ask party D to inform him 
of party A's failure to keep the first mortgage payments up, paying 
property insurance and taxes so that they might make the payment and 
prevent foreclosure on the part of party B. This is called policing the 
mortgages. 
CMI's second function, the making of small loans, is a very simple 
operation. It begins with individuals in need of funds to supplement 
their incomes or meet some emergencies, coming to CMI's small loans depart¬ 
ment and making application for such a loan. If the application for the 
loan is approved, the individual is granted the loan. If it is not 
approved, a loan is not granted. The small loans are limited to $500 and 
a 90 day repayment period. 
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AMBCO and GMI are two mortgage companies but engaged in different 
activities within the spectrum of mortgage financing. AMBCO, formally a 
mortgage broker, is engaged in the activity of lending to home-owners 
and building contractors through the process of originating mortgage 
contracts as a mortgage banker. These mortgage contracts are not, how¬ 
ever, maintained in any inventory account but are sold to financial 
investors which are AMBCO buying outlets. They are in the main, insti¬ 
tutional investors. On the other hand, CMI is a second mortgage company, 
engaged in the activity of lending through the process of buying second 
mortgages from those individuals who make loans by way of second mortgage. 
Unlike AMBCO, CMI invest for their own portfolio and maintains the second 
mortgage contract in their own inventory account. The two institutions 
together span the whole field of mortgage financing—from origination 
through trading in mortgage papers through final placements of these 
papers with ultimate investors to serving the mortgage loans. 
CHAPTER IV 
FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE 
TWO COMPANIES INVOLVED IN THE STUDY 
Introduction.—As may be remembered, this study is concerned with 
(l) critically reviewing the real estate mortgage financing industry in 
the United States, (2) case studies of two companies in this field, and 
(3) the financial aspects of the operation of these two companies; namely, 
AMBCO and CMI of Atlanta. Having generally studied the operations of the 
two companies in the previous chapter, we must now turn to examine the 
financial aspects of their operations. Before proceeding, two general 
points, summing up the case studies in the previous chapter, may well 
be made. First, both the companies are young, small and each operates 
in its own chosen "niche" in the broad field of real estate mortgage 
financing. Secondly, it may be mentioned that financial data are but the 
"dollar view" of the physical sides of their operations, and as such 
this chapter may well be regarded as another facet of the case studies 
of the previous chapters. The point is necessary to mention because in 
the course of financial analysis further aspects of their operations will 
be developed. 
One more point needs to be made. It is that we were not able to 
obtain complete data on income statements, and as such our basic frame¬ 
work of analysis must be based on the balance sheets of the companies. 
Considering the nature of their operations, it is believed that the 




AMBCO's operations: financial aspects»—Exhibit 4 sets out the 
comparative balance sheet of the completed years since the inception of 
the company. What kind of growth is revealed by the exhibit? The 
company's total business, as seen by the assets volume, has increased 
nearly threefold—from around $130,000 to $3^0,000. More than that, 
over the years the company has turned over a million dollars worth of 
real estate mortgages thanks to the outlets provided by the North Carolina 
Insurance Company and the New York Savings Bank, as mentioned earlier. 
Of course, the "warehouse" financing, provided by the Trust Company of 
Georgia, has also been helpful in the process. As may be recalled, the 
mortgages originated by the company were not usually placed with the 
outlets immediately on their conclusion, but are held over for short 
periods by way of "inventory"; and, it is this holding of "inventory" 
that is financed by availing of the credit line granted by the Trust 
Company of Georgia. In the nature of things,, the balance sheet data, as 
presented, do not directly reflect this large volume of business turnover 
already effected by the company. In any event, judging growth either by 
assets or by the total business turnover as of December 1963, the company 
shows considerable growth. 
At this point, a few aspects of how this growth has come about may 
be explained. First, confining now entirely to the balance sheet picture, 
while the total assets volume has increased threefold over the period, 
the company's total liabilities have increased nearly ten times over the 
same period. Its equity base has been allowed to go up only by $7,000. 
The entire growth has thus been based upon "trading on the equity". The 
debt-to-net worth ratio shows extreme change over a short period of three 
Exhibit il 
Atlanta Mortgage Brokerage Company Comparative 
Balance Sheet Statement 
12-31-61 to 12-31-63 
12-31-61 12-31-62 12-31-63 
Assets 
Cash-Checking Acct. $59,553.03 $1*7,81*8.55 $2i*,361.03 
Cash-Saving Accts. -0- -0- 51*5.20 
Accounts Rec. -0- 80.28 -0- 
Mortgage Rec. 60,278.68 Hi*, 691.49 291,1*33.92 
Interest Rec. 81.25 -0- -0- 
Prepaid Expenses 5o.oo 507.07 736.70 
Saving Acct. Rest. 11,1*72.1*6 ll,99lt.53 
Fur. & Fixture 2,181.01 3,1*56.17 3,691.55 
Leasehold Imprv. 6,71*9.1*9 6,71*9.1*9 6,71*9.1*9 
Qrganiz. Expenses 1*1*7.82 31*1*. 1*8 2i0-.ll* 
Other Assets 75.00 170.98 —0— 
Total Assets IÏS97UÎS30 $185,1*26.97 $339,755.56 
Liabilities 
Notes Payb.-Bank 22,000.00 66,232.75 211,275.00 
Accounts Payb. 
Unremitted Payroll 
lltf.oi 562.1*0 1,081.81* 
taxes 173.52 199.97 286.10 
Escrow Deposit -0- 962.16 -0- 
Accured Interest 
Provision for Income 
-0- 272.22 1,1*1*3.57 
taxes -0- -0- 580.89 
Total Liab. $22,370.53 $68,229.50 $2ll*,6Ï7.1*0 
Capital 
Common Stock 53,280.00 51*,680.00 51*,780.00 
Paid in Surplus 53,280.00 51*,680.00 51*, 780.00 
Retained Earnings ( 1,801.03) (857.63) 1,1*11.26 
Total Cap. flU8',5'62";j7 $H0,97T.^ 
Dep. Adjm. 
Unearned Discount 
876.80 2,953.60 1*, 871.90 
Adjm. i,5oo.oo 5,735.50 9,293.00 
Total Liab. & 
Capital $129,U6.30 $185,1*20.97 $339,753.56 
Net Profit or 
Loss (1,801.03) 91*3.1*0 2,361*.87 
Source: Company's Records. 
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years—from 1î5 to lî.O5i Surely such extreme shifts as revealed here 
cannot possibly be approximating to the industry's average experience. 
It is true that real estate mortgage financing, in the nature of things, 
must rely on considerable "trading on equity". But it is the limit to 
which it has been stretched and the haste with which it has been done 
that is being emphasized here. 
Secondly, turning at this point to the Exhibit £, showing changes 
in the working capital through the years, it is extremely significant that 
the working capital should stand at lower figure at the end of the period 
than what it was at the start of the company. It indicates that even 
though the volume of business and. asset holding have been increasing 
very fast, the company has not thought fit to strengthen its working 
capital base. On the contrary, it has tried to wring out greater turn¬ 
over of its reduced working capital. While this would indicate managerial 
efficiency, what would happen if the planned and smooth business turnover 
should experience temporary slowing down for reasons beyond the control 
of the company? The company's business turnover is largely dependent on 
a few factorss (l) the construction schedule of the borrower, (2) the 
buying outlets taking over the originated mortgages on scheduled dates, 
and (3) the "warehouse" banker financing the company over the interim 
period. Clearly, at any point, difficulties, even if it be of passing 
nature, may come up—difficulties in the building trade or shortage of 
materials such that construction may not proceed on schedule; the bank 
may suddenly find itself hemmed by the Federal Reserve Regulations and 
there may be red tape at the outlet end. Is not the working capital or 
equity leverage of the company, in its present financial structure and 
Exhibit 5 
Atlanta Mortgage Brokerage Company Change In 




Cash-Checking Acct. $ 1*9,553.05 
Cash-Saving Acct. -o- 
Accts. Rec. -0- 
Mortgage Rec. 60,278.68 
Interest Rec. 81.25 
Prepaid Expenses 50.00 
Total Cur. Assets $119,962.98 
Current Liab. 





Escrow Deposit -0- 
Accured Interest 
Provision for Income 
-0- 
taxes -0- 
Unearned Discount 1,500.00 
Total Cur. Liab. 
Working Capital $96,11*2.1*5 
12-31-63 
12-31-62 12-31-63 
| 1*7,81*6.55 $21*,361.03 
-0- 51*5.20 
80.28 -0- 












$89,262.39 $ 93,166.45 
Change in Working Capital ($6,880.07) |3,9Q1*.Q6 
Source î Company1s Records. 
assets-volume holding, extremely unsatisfactory? 
We do not know the usual financial pattern of real estate mortgage 
companies that are well established and are of long standing—whether 
they rely on such "thin equity" and such low working capital as our 
company does. Even if they did, it seems to us that a young company 
such as AMBCO should not drift in this direction as far as it has gone. 
For, much of the success to equity owners from "trading on equity" must 
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heavily depend on secure earnings picture and established corporation 
reputation—factors that the company has yet to earn for itself. 
Finally, let us examine the nature of dependence on debt structure. 
Taking a synoptic view of the balance sheets, the position would look 
like this: 
TABLE III 
Synoptic View of the Balance Sheet 
Assets 
1961 1962 1963 
Liabilities 
1961 1962 1963 
Cash 60 U8 25 Notes Payable 22 66 211 
Mortgage rec. 60 115 291 Capital Funds 105 108 111 
Leasehold and Fur.* 7 11 6 
127 17 h 322 
127 322 
^Approximate and several data lumped together for convenience. 
What stands out from the table is the inexorable fact that the 
entire growth has been based upon the short term credit line from the 
banks. Yet, though the mortgage receiveables are considered short term 
assets of self liquidating nature, more or less, they are not, completely 
so in fact—-not as self liquidating as commercial papers. It is true 
that mortgage loans acquired by life insurance companies and savings and 
loans associations have been consistently increasing from year to year. 
But the rate of growth is not as much as the growth in the company’s 
own holdings of mortgage receiveables. Between 1957 and 1963, life 
insurance companies doubled their rate of acquisition of non-farm 
mortgages from $U,823 million to $8,13U million, the increase mainly 
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showing in other than FHA and VA loans, which were more or less steady in 
volume over the period.1 In the case of Savings and Loan Associations, 
who do most of their investments themselves, the same trend is more or 
less evident. One may, therefore, well ask: is not the company fast 
moving to a position of "over commitment?" May it not find itself over 
committed if the bankers should suddenly find it necessary to pull out of 
the financing, at least temporarily? 
In posing this question for the company two other small points on 
trends in mortgage financing may be noted. (1) as seen from the data on 
FNMA, purchase and sales of mortgage transactions during various years 
since 1957 do not show any consistent trends FNMA’s sales during 1963 
was nearly four times more than its purchases. It would, therefore, 
seem rather uncertain for the company to rely too much on the open 
market to unload its holdings of mortgage receivables in case of 
emergent needs, (2) if FNMA's data is any guide, even commitments are not 
disbursed all too smoothly; for example, in the years 1958 to 1961 there 
were fairly large amounts of commitment loans that did not get disbursed: 
the figure ranged from $1,541 million in 1958 to $631 million in 1961.^ 
The difficulties in the turnover of loans originated by the company, must 
take full note of these trends, especially when the company's inventory 
is financed, as explained before. Indeed, it is interesting to note 
here that the rising trend in the Company's holding of mortgage receive- 
^Federal Reserve Bulletin, (April, 1964), p. 490-91. 
2Ibid. 
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ables were explained to us as being largely due to not being taken up 
by their outlets. It should also be noted that the data on FNMA., on 
which we draw to make the points, relate only to secured loans of FHA 
and VA categories. We cannot help feeling that the company has "over 
extended" its financial position—much too loaned up— and may find it¬ 
self in difficulty on any unexpected turn of events. Debt financing 
would seem to be precariously poised. 
When we turn to look into growth in retained earnings—as a 
hopeful source to reduce the imbalance in the capital situation—it 
does not appear to be anything much better. Exhibit 6 is the picture 
of earnings and their disposal. The under pinning of financial 
structure must be viewed as an extremely slow moving phenomenon. 
One further point of earnings should be brought out. The gross 
margin is extremely low. This is because the company relies so heavily 
on borrowed funds and the spread between lost of funds and earnings on 
the same is, in the nature of the situation, j low. This is more so 
because the company is oriented towards insured or guarateed FHA and VA 
loans—loans which by virtue of their safety carry lower interest rates. 
In consequence, in the quest of profit, the company has turned to larger 
volume of business as reflected in ever growing mortgage receiveables. 
How about the earnings picture? The data are assembled in Exhibit 
6. In the first year the company incurred a loss. As of 1963, the 
earnings on the equity works out at less than 2%. This is perhaps due 
to two facts: (a) that a large part of finance for the holding comes 
from borrowed funds; and (b) the spread between interest cost on 
borrowings from the bank and the earnings on mortgages is not 
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Exhibit 6 
Atlanta Mortgage Brokerage Company 
Changes in Surplus Account 
12-31-61 to 12-31-63 
12-31-62 12-31-63 12-31-61 to 
Earned Surplus 
beginning ($1,801.03) ($ 857.63) 
12-31-63 
($1,801.03) 
Profit for the 
year 91+3.1+0 2,361*. 87 2,361*.87 
Surplus Adjm. not 
reflected on Bal. 
sheet -0— ( 95.98) 81+7.1+2 
Earned Surplus 
ending ($ 837.67) $1,1*11.26 $1,1*11.26 
Atlanta 
Exhibit 7 
Mortgage Brokerage Company Source and 
Application of Funds 




12-31-63 12-31-61 to 
Source of Funds 
Depreciation $2,116.80 $1,918.30 
12-31-63 
$1+,035.10 
Common Stock 1,1+00.00 100.00 i,5oo.oo 
Paid in Surplus i,i*oo.oo 100.00 i,5oo.oo 
Amortization of 
org. Exp. 103.31+ 103.31+ 206.68 
Net Profit 91+3.1+0 2,361*. 87 2,361+. 87 
Other Assets -0- 107.98 75.00 
Adjm. Surp. Acct. -0— -0- 81*7.1+2 
Total Souree of 
funds $5,963.31+ $1*,757.1+9 $10,529.07 
Application of Funds 
Saving Acct. Rest. 11,1*72.1+6 $ 522.07 ll,99i+.57 
Purchase of Fur. & 
Fixtures 1,275.16 235.38 1,510.51+ 
Other Assets 95.98 -0- -0- 
Adjm. to Surp. of 
Acct. -0- 95.98 -0- 
Total Application 
of Funds $12,81*3.60 $ 853.1+3 $13,505.07 
Net Change in W. C. l$6,880.06 $3,90i+.o6 ($2,976.00 
Source: Company's Records 
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considerable, especially after allowance is made for expenses of operation. 
However, this conclusion must be tempered by one important consideration. 
This is with reference to unearned discount. This is the contingent or 
deferred income arising out of the mortgage holdings as will be explained 
later. Given the holding of the mortgages of the size, as given in the 
balance sheet, these earnings will become realized earnings. Accordingly, 
on a full view of the operations, the total earnings that would result 
may roughly be taken at $11,600 approximately. Set against the equity, 
this would indicate an yield of 10 per cent or thereabout. The ultimate 
profit picture, accordingly, would seem to be much fairer than is the case 
on immediate view, subject of course to the points made earlier; namely, 
large dependence on short-term borrowing to finance relatively long¬ 
term commitments in the hope that there would be no problem of finding 
ready market for the large mortgage receivables or passing them on to 
the outlets. While the company's financial practice seem to be materi¬ 
ally helping the earnings picture—wiping out early losses and contem¬ 
plating good earnings to networth, as estimated—its contribution to 
financial growth is extremely negligible. In the background of basic 
imbalance in the capitalization, especially because of exclusive emphasis 
on short-term debt, the profit pick up, however good, must be viewed 
as more speculative and less dependable. In short, the company is yet 
to move to a kind of minimum basic level of earnings—and this will not 
come about unless the present riskiness in financing operations are con¬ 
siderably reduced by a more desireable capital structure. 
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This brings us to look more closely into the trend of mortgage 
receivable which has shown a five fold increase over a three year 
period. How do we explain the growth in this item in the balance sheet? 
The management proved to be too reticent on the point. However, it was 
explained to us that this arose largely because these mortgages were not 
or could not be placed with the outlets, that is, North Carolina Insurance 
and New York Savings Bank. There is also yet another explanation. It 
may be the holding of mortgage receivables is largely of an "interim" 
nature—by way of "inventoiy" in other words. Generally speaking, the 
company originates a mortgage for the development of property according 
to agreed specifications of development, and advances the money on the 
mortgage to the borrower to put through the same. Of course, it may 
obtain prior commitment from its correspondent investors. The commit¬ 
ment does not usually follow the take over. On the contrary, the commit¬ 
ment is generally on the basis of completed development of the property. 
There is thus an "interim" period between the origination of mortgage 
and the company passing it on to the final investor. During this period, 
the company holds on to the mortgage with its attendant risks. Thus, 
the mortgage receivable may be explained as due to (a) investment by 
the company on its own account; (b) failing to persuade the final in¬ 
vestor to take over for one reason or another; and (c) temporary holdings 
by the company for the interim period. We do not know the exact 
proportion of these different kinds in the total holding, and therefore, 
the risk that this fast growing holding imply. However, one generally 
observation seems to be in order. Considering that its over- all 
volume of business has been increasing, and considering that, even 
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on most optimistics view, the company must be prepared to finance for an 
"interim* period—considering these two factors, it may be said that the 
growth is a natural concomitant of the growing business volume, hi other 
words, drawing an analogy from industrial enterprises, it may be said 
that even on a conservative view of the company's operations, the large 
volume must call forth larger inventory in much the same way that a 
manufacturer must carry larger inventory in order .to match larger sales or 
production, as the case may be. Viewing the growing holding in this manner 
and this gives the company's operations most favorable interpretation— 
so viewed, it must be concluded that the company must increase its base 
level inventory, so to speak, to support its growing volume of business. 
Accordingly, financing of this larger base level inventory must be con¬ 
sidered as a long-term need for funds rather than one that is well met 
from short term borrowed funds. In other words, the growth of mortgage 
receivables, assuming that it indicate growth trend in business volume— 
we are speaking of business of origination and placing of mortgage with 
the final investor—is not a temporary "bulge" but is one of a long-term 
nature. Should not the oompany, then, make a basic re-organization of 
its capital and debt structure to take care of this? 
One further point should be made at this stage. Most of the 
operations have so far been in the area of FHA and VA mortgages rather 
than in the conventional types. The distinction between the two cate¬ 
gories is surely important. The first group are insured loans, and risk 
of loss is thus nil, and as such their placement either through the out¬ 
lets or in the open market may not be difficult. But if statistical data 
available on these two categories are any guide about the future shape of 
the demand for mortgage loans, it would seem that it is the conventional 
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category which is to be very much in demand in the future. Looking over 
the available statistical data, it appears that the rate of acquisition 
of mortgage loans of the FHA and VA category has been more or less stable 
since 1958. We refer to the acquisitions by life insurance and savings 
and loan associations. On the other haad, the outstanding conventional 
loans of savings and loan associations—we have data only for them—have 
more than doubled since 1957. It need also be mentioned that it is in 
this area that earnings on investment is much more than in the other. 
Granted this trend, the risk factor in mortgage holding, especially in 
unloading holdings on grounds of necessity, such liquidating investment., 
must necessarily increase. And, as such, it is a moot question whether 
the company in trying to pick up more volume in the future could rely 
exclusively on the present capital structure. Where and how has the 
company been getting funds for the expansion, as observed? The questions 
has already been answered in the foregoing analysis. However, the visual 
aspect of the answer is seen in Exhibits V and VII, giving net changes 
in the working capital and the source and application of funds respectively. 
One single largest source, overshadowing all others by long margin, has 
been the short-term borrowings from the bank. One largest application of 
funds, again overshadowing all other applications, have been the holding 
of mortgage receivables. 
This brings us to make concluding observations on the financial 
aspect of the operations of the company. There is much dependence on 
short-term funds to finance its operations and their growth, almost to 
the point of infusing inordinate riskiness in its ventures and earningsj 
the extremely relatively low equity base would not appear to provide 
reasonable cushion for shocks of unexpected turn of events that may govern 
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its operations, more so because the liabilities are all of short-term 
nature; greater emphasis on FHA and VA type of loans, however, tend to 
reduce the riskiness of its operations to some extent—only to some extent 
because while such govemmentally secured loans may not pose problems of 
solvency, it may well pose problems of illiquidity through lack of fair 
match between the sources of funds and their application in terms of time 
factor. It would, therefore, appear to us that the company's financial 
structure or policy is not optimistically suited to the expansion policy 
that the management is presently pursuing. It would also appear that 
even though the company is operating in the main in the sheltered area of 
FHA and VA loans, it might fruitfully consider diversifying its mortgage 
banking activities on a wider front, especially by giving consideration 
to conventional loans where the earning on units of investment is obviously 
more 
CMI's Operations: Financial Aspects 
Exhibits 8, 9, 10, and 11 set out the financial data of the com¬ 
pany. These exhibits are: (1) comparative balance; (2) changes in the 
working capital; (3) changes in the surplus account and (1*) source and 
application of funds statement respectively. 
As may be remembered, CME is essentially in the mortgage financing 
business. It does not have any correspondent or buying outlet like the 
AMBCO. It is, however, operating in the financing of second or junior 
mortgage. The company has recently gone into small loan financing. 
Keeping these differentiating features of the company—difference from 
the AMBCO—in mind, we may now proceed to examine the financial aspects 
of the operations of GMI more or less in the same manner as we did in the 
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case of the other company. 
What is the growth trend of the company? How has it grown over 
the seven years of its existence? What kind of overall financial problem 
do we observe in the financial data presented in the Exhibits? 
During the seven year period, the company's total assets have 
grown nearly eight fold. Unlike in the case of the other company, which 
was, in a way, doing agency function for the buying outlets, CMI's out¬ 
standing mortgage loans and personal loans data as given in Exhibit 8, 
correctly reflects the company's growth trend in business turnover. Of 
course, the balance sheet leaves out any buying and selling of mortgage 
loans that the company may be doing. However, being in business on its 
own account, CMI's dealings in second mortgages of this kind could not be 
very significant. Anyway, with the reservation on the point ju st mentioned, 
it will be seen that the company's business volume has increased five folds 
over the period. What is even more, the growth has been consistent from 
year to year. 
It is necessary to mention here that since the company operates 
mainly in the second mortgage market, the average period that loans are 
outstanding should be less than it would be if it were handling first 
mortgages. It is also perhaps the case that unit value of second mort¬ 
gages—average size of mortgage loans—would be smaller. As we mentioned 
earlier, the company does not originates and hold second mortgages but 
buy up such second mortgages as available for sale. The upshot of this 
aspect of the company's operations is that it is able to obtain fair 
amounts of diversification and maturity distribution in its portfolio. 
Of course, from the balance sheet figures on mortgage loans, we cannot arrive 
at any definite conclusion on this point. There is however, a presumption 
Exhibit 8 
Consolidated Mortgage Investment Company- 
Comparative Balance Sheet 
6-30-58 to 12-31-63 
6-30-58 6-30-59 6-30-60 12-31-61 12-31-62 12-31-63 
Assets 
Cash in Bank 2,138.66 2,561*.76 9,168.78 8,713.35 5,222.16 3,498.23 
Personal Loans -0- 1,252.32 36,511.22 45,266.59 60,073.80 63,680.39 
Mortgage Loans 66,645.45 98,704.35 88,481.97 110,002.66 152,684.55 145,448.10 
Organization Exp., Escrow 
Acct. & Notes Payable 628.70 22.73 -0- 132.50 -0- -0- 
Office Fur. Fix. & Real 
Estate 546.88 1,193.1*2 3,259.32 75,442.75 87,101.09 99,877.66 
Subscription 1,580.00 6,560.00 15,880.00 18,680.00 7,791.20 7,771.20 
Total Assets Ï7ttZÜÏÏ $liü,2ÿ7.58 $153,301.29 $258, 10**. 85 $31**, 836.80 ÊM&œzm 
Liabilities 
S/S & W/H Taxes Payb. -0- 97.58 320.14 364.44 483.65 394.22 
Unearned Int.,Fees,& Ins. -0- -0- 8,565.18 10,607.72 l4,h72.o2 14,713.04 
Notes Payb.-Bank 2,500.00 10,1*0.30 11,710.90 25,471.58 30,402.90 33,371.92 
Notes Payb.-Others -0- 1*, 000.00 2,190.00 2,690.00 8,619.98 —0— 
Unearned Discounts 30,239.20 1*3,018.72 37,883.59 45,348.85 62,512.89 62,863.42 
A/P & Prop. Mgrm. Payb. -0- -0- 218.58 121.53 —0— -0- 
Mortgage Payable -0- —0— —0— 53,969.59 64,178.67 63,894.06 
Total Liab. Ü32,f39'.2b § 57,261.60 $ 60,888.39 $138,441.21 $180,670.11 $175,236.66 
Capital 
Preferred Stock 1,000.00 4,000.00 4,ooo.oo 4,000.00 4,000.00 4,000.00 
Common Stock 27,500.00 27,500.00 27,500.00 27,500.00 27,500.00 27,500.00 
Class "A" Common Stock 3,200.00 7,808.00 28,852.00 36,940.00 52,497.00 62,601.51 
Subscription 1,580.00 6,560.00 15,880.00 18,680.00 7,791.20 7,771.20 
Capital Surplus 85o.oo 3,592.00 9,951.00 23,828.75 22,699.92 21,657.92 
Earned Surplus 1,587.37 3,380.68 5,751.98 8,106.99 4,027.09 17,193.37 
Total Capital 
1 ■$5S,'84"ô‘3H -$118,455:74 $Ï31,651’.Y8 $140,728.00 
Depreciation Adjm. 78.12 193.30 477.92 1,207.90 2,514.91 4,260.92 
Total Liab. & Capital I71Y554.'S? $110,297.56 $I5J,3ôr;^ “$?5ïï,ïo05 imife'ôTBü $320,225.68 
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in favor of the company. It should also be mentioned here that while 
AMBOO did not have much problem of maturity it certainly has the problem 
of diversification in as much as it seems to be holding large amounts of 
primary mortgages. As against this kind of situation, GMI, dealing in 
smaller unit values of transactions and holding second mortgages, can achieve 
a fair diversification and maturity distribution. When we add to this its 
recent entry into personal loans, the aspect of maturity and diversification 
in the investment portfolio tends to be more within the control of the 
management. 
How has the growth been achieved? Here, we observe that the company's 
ownership funds have also increased five folds over the entire period—from 
around $30,000 to around $11*1,000, Over the period, the company has raised 
different types of capital, common and perferred stock. However, the com¬ 
pany has also increased its funds from debt. Butthey have been partly in 
the shape of mortgages payable. There is not complete reliance on short¬ 
term borrowings from the bank. In fact* this is only one half of the 
mortgages payable. Accordingly, growth financing has been with conscious 
attention to the time factor of funds made use of. It is also to be 
mentioned that generation of funds from operation has also contributed to 
financing the growth. This is seen in the movement of earned surplus and 
depreciation funds. 
To sum up the points so far made, it would seem that while net 
worth to debt has fallen over the period—from 1î3 in 1957 to 1:1.2 in 
1963—we cannot hold that the company has tried to grow by trading on the 
equity with single-minded devotion. The following Table clearly demostrates 
the conclusion we have arrived at. 
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TABLE IV 
INCREASE IN SOURCE AND APPLICATION OF FUNDS 
1957 to 1963 
Increase in Sources 
1957 to 1963 
Increase in Application 
1957 to 1963 
Mortgage Holdings + $116,000 Liabilities + $150,000 
Personal Loans + 63,000 Capital Funds + 128,000 
Fur., Fix., & 
Real Estate + 99,000 
Totals + $278,000 + $278,000 
Note: Only changes are shownj capital funds include unearned dis¬ 
counts and depreciation adjustment. 
How about the trend of working capital in relation to growth in 
volunBof business? In Exhibit 9, we estimate the size of working capital 
from year to year. As may be seen there, the company has consistently 
improved its working capital commensurate with expansion that it has a- 
chieved over the years. There is no undue reliance on bank borrowings 
in building up this trend. It is interesting here to abstract from Ex¬ 
hibits 8, 9 and 11 (page 77) a concise and rough source and application 
of funds statement. 
How about the earnings picture of the company? In Exhibit 10 (page 
75) we have movement of the company's surplus—beginning surplus, net profit 
each year and the total surplus before taxes. We also indicated the rate 
of dividend that the company has declared over the period. Now, using the 
surplus account statement and dividends actually declared for the common 
stock on the one hand, and common stock of all categories, we can judge 
the trend of earnings per share. As of I960, it may be estimated at 11 
per cent while for the year 1962, the figure would be around 25 per cent. 
Of course these are earnings before taxes and not after taxes. One further 
Exhibit 9 
Consolidated Mortgage Investment Company Changes 
in Working Capital Statement 
6-30-58 to 12-31-63 
6-30-58 6-30-59 12-30-60 12-31-61 12-31-62 12-31-63 
Current Assets 
Cash in Bank 
Personal Loans 
Mortgage Loans 
































Total Cur. Assets $70,91*2.36 $109,081.1*3 $150,01*1.97 $182,795.10 $225,735.71 $220,397.92 
Current Liabilities 
S/S & W/fe Taxes Payb. 
Unearned Int.,Fees,& Ins. 
Notes Payb. & Bank 
Notes Payb. & Others 
Unearned Discounts 
Mortgage Payable 











































Total Cur. Liab. $32,739.20 $57,261.60 $60,888.39 $138,573.71 $180,670.11 $175,236.66 
Working Capital $38,203.16 $51,819.83 $89,153.58 $ 1*1*, 221.39 $ 1*5,065.60 $ 1*5,161.26 
Changes in W.C. $8,807.81 $13,616.67 $ 1*,875.85 ($1*1*, 932.15») $ 81*1*.21 $ 95.66 
Exhibit 10 
Consolidated Mortgage Investment Company 
Changes In Surplus Account 
6-1-59 To 12-31-63 
6-1-59 6-30-60 1961 1962 1963 7-1-57 to 
12-31-63 
Earned Surplus Beginning 




















Earned Surp. Ending 
(before taxes) $ 1*,177.ÜÜ $ 3,837.29 $ 9,582.25 $21,190.75 $25,877.11 $25,877.11 
Dividends $ -0- $ 21*1.1*9 $ -o- $ 2,72h.80 $ 2,721*.80 $1*, 212.1*0 
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aspect of earnings should be noted here. It is the trend of unearned 
discount, as shown in th. balance sheet in Exhibit 8. As in the case of 
the AMBCQ, these are deferred items of income related to the mortgage 
holdings already in the possession of the company, and as such would be¬ 
come income through passage of time and maturity of mortgages. These are 
amounts which are included in the face value of the mortgages. As borrowers 
repay their mortgage debts in installments, the installments would obviously 
consist of (a) part of the capital and (b) part of the total discount on 
the mortgage. Of course the interest is paid separately. The later would 
then become earned discount. In view of these considerations, the earnings 
picture that we have presented would look still more favorable if these 
contingent or deferred incomes were also brought into calculation. 
To sum up the financial aspects of the operations of the company: 
the oompany has a very fair earnings picture; it has grown very well over 
the years, and in financing this growth it has not unduly depended on 
borrowed funds, particularly short-term funds. On the contrary, it has 
underpinned its resources by strengthening its equity base and dependence 
on these more than on long-term borrowing. It is through this that it 
has derived the benefits of trading on the equity for its stockholders. 
Looking ahead, one might even take the view that, as of 1963, the company 
has considerable leverage for taking further advantage of trading on its 
equity to improve its business volume and earnings potential. If our 
appraisal is fairly correct, it is not very clear why the company has tried 
to reduce its mortgage receivables to move into the new field of personal 
loans in 1962. Consistently with our interpretation the only reason that 
can be advanced is that the company wanted to achieve better risk dis- 
Exhibit 11 
Consolidated Mortgage Investment Company Source 
And Application Of Funds Statement 
7-1-59 To 12-31-63 
1959 I960 1961 1962 1963 7-1-57 To 
12-13-63 
Sources of Funds 
Depreciation $ 117.1b $ 129.29 $ 729.98 $ 1,307.01 $ 1,746.01 $ 4,182.80 
Preferred Stock -0- -0- -0- -0- -0- 4,000.00 
Common Stock -0- -0- -0- —0— -0- 9,550.00 
Class "An Common Stock 4,606.00 19,676.00 8,088.00 15,557.00 10,104.51 62,601.51 
Paid in Surplus 2,742.00 6,357.50 13,877.75 -0— -0- 21,657.92 
Net Profit for Year 2,569.71 1,169.61 3,830.27 13,083.76 8,713.45 8,713.45 
Organization Expense 22.72 22.73 —0— -0- -0- 136.35 
Stock Subscription Collected 4, 980.00 6,920.00 2,200.00 -0- -0- -0- 
Adjm. made to bring into 
balance -0- -0- -0- -0- —0— 14,685.06 
Total Sources of Funds $13,059.61 $36,447.13 $28,726.00 $29,947.77 $20,563.97 $125,527.11 
Application of Funds 
Dividends $ -0- $ 2hl.h0 $ —0— $ 2,Y2h.8u $ 4,212.40 $ 4,212.40 
Stock Subsc.-not Collected -0- -0- -0- 10,288.00 20.00 1,878.80 
Income Taxes 796.ho 857.69 1,475.26 1,302.29 4,467.34 4,467.34 
Purchase of Assets 
Adjm. due to change in 
646.34 1,157.14 71,182.93 13,658.84 10,726.57 99,202.66 
Capt. -0- 1,733.00 "0— -0- -0- -0- 
Paid in Surplus Decreased -0- -0- -o- 1,128.83 1,042.00 -0- 
Total Application of 
Funds $ 1,442.94 $ 3,989.23 $73,658.19 $29,103.56 $20,468.31 $109,761.20 
Equal to Change in 
Working Capital $13,616.67 $32,457.90 ($44,932.19) $ 844.21 95.66 $15,765.91 
tribution in its overall investment activity than was the case prior to 
entry into the new activity and faster turnover of its working funds— 




Mortgage financing is an integral function in the credit structure 
of the country. It is a channel through which the individual savings 
of the community as accumulated in certain types of financial institutions, 
are made available to those who build and develop the homes, factories, 
offices, farms, and ranches that the country requires. The financial 
instiutions, operating in this field, provide the necessary safeguard so 
that savings should move into the right places and in the right amounts 
into tangible economic wealth for the country. In the totality of savings, 
and investment, mortgage financing and financial institutions thus play 
an important part. 
In the postwar period, the mortgage financing industry has become 
the principal means for effecting a wide geographic distribution of private 
and institutional funds for employment for constructional purposes through¬ 
out the country. This process has been very much helped by the emergence 
of governmentally sponsored mortgage insurance and guaranteeing agencies, 
namely FHA, VA, AMFA and others. This is because such insurance or guaran¬ 
tee has raised many of the real estate mortgages to the level of secured 
investments, acceptable to, and permissible for, many institutional and 
trust agencies throughout the country. This, in turn, has helped the 
deepening and broadening of the market for real estate mortgages. It has 
helped to introduce stability into the construction industry--a long felt 
need since the construction industry is one of the important stabilizers 
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of the country's economy. 
As arising from the growth of the industry, as just mentioned, 
there has been considerable growth of financial institutions—mortgage 
companies of various types and functions-to serve the investors and 
borrowers interested in real estate developments. Therefore, it is ex¬ 
tremely necessary that the growing institution should operate efficiently 
and not develop unhealthy or unethical trends in their operations. 
The country knows well how the growth of commercial banking has had to 
go through the painful process of periodic bank failures until the de¬ 
velopment of the Federal Reserve System and FDIC came to strengthen the 
entire banking system. As of now, mortgage financing institutions have 
been coming up something like the unit banks prior to 1863. The laws of 
mortgages—on the basis of which mortgage financing must proceed—are as 
many as the number of states in the Union—somewhat reminiscient of the 
chaotic state laws on banking prior to 1863. 
This developing situation suggests the desirability of changes on the 
part of many agencies directly or indirectly connected with mortgage finan¬ 
cing. On the side of state government, substantial renovation of laws 
covering mortgage contracts and investments is called for in order to re¬ 
duce the impediments to interstate mortgage transactions. On the side 
of the federal government, emphasis needs to be placed on FHA as a means 
for pooling risks and standardizing the quality of the security for real 
estate credit, eliminating many impediments that hinder smooth functioning 
of the mortgage insurance system in the financial markets. Changes in the 
federal tax structure that would be conducive to the growth and more effec¬ 
tive conduct of the mortgage financing industry should also be considered. 
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On the part of the industry, an increase in the average size of 
operating units appear to be inevitable if the mortgage financing business 
is to expand or even maintain its present important position in the finan¬ 
cial structure. Even with stronger units, the industry as a whole may 
have difficulty in assuring substantial growth until it can lessen its 
dependence upon its present sources of funds and find alternative ways 
of reaching savings that could be induced to invest in mortgages or se¬ 
curities backed by mortgages. 
Turning now to the two companies which constitute part of the 
study, a few concluding observations may well be made. First, both com¬ 
panies are small—all too small to be really viable on a long horizon in 
an industry such as real estate mortgage financing. However, intelligently 
is the chosen "niche" of a company, there is a constant danger of inad¬ 
vertently starying into commitment of long-term nature: the large holdings 
of mortgage receivables of AMBCO is an ominous pointer of such contingency. 
Secondly, there is an inherent danger in eking out a highly localized 
existence, such as these companies do by confining themselves exclusively 
to Atlanta. Mortgage investment is essentially long-term in nature, and 
better risk distribution—geographically, functionally and otherwise—must 
be one of the major underlying objectives of the activities, howsoever 
specialized,in real estate mortgage financing. Third, related to this 
is the basic recognition that unless a mortgage financing institution 
should attain an optimum size or scale, it must remain exposed to the 
fundamental risks inherent in real estate mortgage financing. Judged from 
this viewpoint, both companies are far below the optimum. It is true that 
it is very difficult to identify "optimum unit" in any industry in practice. 
All the same, some broad agreement should not be difficult to reach. Keeping 
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such perspective we take the view that these companies are far below 
what should be considered "optimum size" for the mortgage financing in¬ 
dustry. 
The issue of size raises the question as to how the "optimum" 
may be reached. Of course, the alternatives are: through evolution or 
through merger. If our earlier observations have validity, the evolutionary 
path may well prove to be too long drawn and basically precarious. It 
may be mentioned here that in the field of commercial banking, institutions 
have tried to grow more often through merger than otherwise. The history 
of American Banking has been throughout a history of merger. The vested 
interest groups have always finally been able to reconcile themselves in 
the larger interests of their respective enterprises. Why should the 
problem of interest groups prove insurmountable in this field of mortgage 
financing? 
This brings us to venture an observation with reference to the two 
companies involved in this study. Should these two companies merge into 
one institution, the new institution arising out of it would gain con¬ 
siderably in viability in many respects. Covering then a wider spectrum 
of mortgage financing than is the case with each separately, the new 
institution will gain in diversification, risk distribution and growth in 
resources and management's ability. This in turn will enable the new in¬ 
stitution to set right any imbalance in the capital structure that would 
be found on merger of the companies. Individually, they are too small to 
command enough resources to take advantage of business opportunities in 
full. AHBCO is definitely deficient in its capital structure. As we 
found, it is a risky existence by extreme dependence on short-term 
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borrowing. It would also appear that it has just been unable to raise 
enough equity capital for their purpose and the same would be true of 
long-term debt financing. CMI has surely raised more equity capital. 
Even then, the fact that it has started to starve its mortgage financing 
to feed the newly opened personal loans division would suggest that 
difficulty in raising further equity or debt funds. From our field 
interviews, we also gained the impression that CMI was not at times able 
to take advantage of more business for dearth of resources. 
Given these considerations, our third observation would be that as 
a long-term policy the two companies should seriously think of merging to 
set up a greater institution. 
From a short range perspective, AMBCO must redress its present 
financial imbalance. The way out of the present impasse lies through 
(l) more equity capital and/or (2) long-term debt financing if the advantage 
of thin equity currently available should have to be retained and if the 
management is rather afraid of losing coritrol. Now, the question arises: 
can the companies really succeed in these directions? Unless the present 
management should put out their own funds or persuade friends to do so on 
the basis of their management ability, the chances of success in either 
direction is rather slim. For if we recall our financial analysis of the 
company, AMBCO, in its present state, would hardly offer the prospective 
investors the necessary security of investment or security of earnings 
thereon. If the management should be unwilling to share control, the 
chances of success must be considered still more remote. For the investor 
to come in to provide long-term debt funds, what is the security that the 
company has to offer? 
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In these respects, CMI is in a better position. But the question 
is! how much better? Is it enough to take it through the long pull up to 
near about an optimum size company? We are inclined to answer the question 
in the negative. 
To sum up our observations on the two companies, one is living 
with the agonising problem of meeting long-term needs by short-term re¬ 
sources—periodically renewing short-term borrowing means—and remedial 
measures are immediately called for; the other has more or less, reached 
a plateau wherefrom further growth can come about only with major large 
scale financing; at the helm there is a close-knit and extremely com¬ 
petent management group, and if they should coalesce to compound their 
problems, a bigger, better and more well balanced and diversified organi¬ 
zation may develop with brighter prospect of raising more funds, according 
to the genius of the combined management, to lift the new unit to a size¬ 
able organization, and put it well on the road to an efficient optimum 
enterprise. 
APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE INTERVIEW 
1. What year was your business established? 
2. Had you been in business before you started the present one? 
3. Had you worked in a similar business? 
h» Where did you get your knowledge of this type of business? 
5. How many other people helped you plan the details of the business 
when you were organizing the company? 
6. What were your toughest problems before you actually started? 
7. How much capital did you think you would need to start the business? 
5. What were the sources of your initial finance or capital? 
9. What was the original capital investment? 
10. What were these funds used for? 
(a) Plant and equipment 
(b) Goods or services to be sold 
(c) Working capital 
11. Did you find you had planned enough capital? 
12. What financial problems did you encounter in the early stages of 
your business development? 
13. How did you solve those financial problems? 
lh. If funds were acquired what was the source? 
15. What financial problems have you had since those encountered in the 
early stages and up to the present? 
16. How did you solve these financial problems? 
17. If funds were acquired what was the source? 
lb. What were the interest rates paid on these funds? 
19. What have been your difficulties in obtaining loans? 
20. What is the present capitalization of the company? 
Company's Standard Industrial Classification? 21. 
22, Was the company originally organized as a 
(a) Sole proprietorship? 
(b) Partnership? 
(c) Corporation? 
23. Is the company at present organized as a 
(a) Sole proprietorship? 
(b) Partnership? 
(c) Corporation? 
2k* How many persons worked for the company when it started business? 
(a) Full employees 
(b) Part-time employees 
25. How many persons are normally employed at the present time? 
26. What was your approximate sales volume in the past year? 
0-421*,000 50,000-99,000 
25,000-1*9,000 100,000-500,000 
27. When you started the company, how long did you think it would be 
before you broke even? 
(a) Years 
(b) If less than a year, months 
2d. How long did it actually take before the business broke even or made 
a profit? 
(a) Years 
(b) If less than a year, months 
29. How has the impact of taxation affect your business growth and 
development? 
30. What financial suggestions would you give a person going into business 
today. 
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